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CHAPTER 11
THE REIGN OF LI-TSUNG (1224–1264)
Richard L. Davis
shih mi-yu¨an in isolation
The sudden elevation of Chao Yu¨n (1205–64) to imperial son only five days
before the death of Emperor Ning-tsung and the replacing of Chao Hung
as heir to the throne might have turned the Sung court into a battlefield of
warring factions. Instead, this irregular transfer of power took place initially
without incident. No mutiny erupted among the guards assigned to protect
Chao Hung. The guards were forcibly detained outside the palace on the night
of Ning-tsung’s death and thereby denied any opportunity to interrupt the
accession. Imperial clansmen living away from Lin-an raised no armies to lead
against the capital with a pledge to restore the throne to its rightful occupant.
The bureaucracy was also muted in its response. No one attempted to assassi-
nate the chief councilor, Shih Mi-yu¨an, for his leading role in the controversial
succession. There was no repeat of the Han T’o-chou incident. Students at the
Imperial University proved uncharacteristically quiet. No indictments were
submitted against powerful ministers exceeding their authority. The politi-
cal elite, if not regarding the succession as legitimate, found it expedient to
confine its suspicions and gossip to private quarters. Even the hot-tempered
Chao Hung seems to have passively accepted his fate. He made no attempt to
turn the bureaucracy against Shih Mi-yu¨an, its increasingly unpopular chief.
The new emperor, known to history as Li-tsung, opted against a distant exile
for his adoptive brother. Chao Hung was quickly moved to the quiet, scenic
fishing town of Hu-chou, where he probably enjoyed considerable freedom of
movement. His noble status was elevated from duke to prince. The indecorous
succession proceeded with face-saving civility, or so seemed the intent of the
parties involved.
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The fate of Chao Hung
The nineteen-year-old Li-tsung, acceding to the throne on 17 September 1224,
occupied himself for the next five months with routine matters of state, as Chao
Hung settled into his new home away from the capital. The northern border,
in uncommon placidity, seemed to be mirroring the climate at court. Then
suddenly, and apparently without the slightest warning or provocation, an
incident that threatened rebellion occurred at Hu-chou.1 In the second month
of 1225 three local men – P’an Jen, his brother P’an Ping, and a cousin, P’an
Fu – led a motley band of fishermen and local militia to the prefectural govern-
ment offices, enumerated the crimes of the chief councilor, and demanded Chao
Hung’s prompt installation as emperor. Claiming the allegiance of some two
hundred thousand crack troops and the support of the prominent Shantung
loyalist Li Ch’u¨an, they threatened to march on the capital if their demands
were not met. Whether the P’an threesome were themselves fishermen is not
clear. Reports of their attempting, sometime before the outbreak, to contact
Li Ch’u¨an suggests some familiarity with the complex array of power among
Lin-an, K’ai-feng, and Shantung and their determination to exploit it. Such
astuteness can hardly be expected of ordinary commoners, yet their amateur
effort implies that the rebels were neither realistic nor experienced in high-
stakes political affairs. With a relatively small force and a remote hope for
assistance from a far-off dissident, the three men dared to challenge the awe-
some might of an imperial government only sixty or so miles away.
Contemporary documents and later histories absolve Chao Hung of com-
plicity in the affair, although his presence at Hu-chou may have inspired the
action. When the rebels came searching for him, it is rumored that he hid
himself in a drainage ditch. When captured and forced to don the yellow robes
of the throne, he consented only after soliciting promises to harm neither the
empress nor “officials,” an apparent allusion to Shih Mi-yu¨an. Subsequently,
the prince allegedly accepted the entire effort as doomed and voluntarily led
prefectural troops in suppressing the outbreak, and killing P’an Ping and P’an
1 On the uprising, see T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 246, pp. 8735–8;
476, pp. 13826, 13829; Pi Yu¨an, Hsu¨ Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter HTC (1958)] [Te-yu¨-t’ang tsang-pan
1801 ed.] (1792; Peking, 1958) 163, pp. 4426–7; Chou Mi, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1291; Peking, 1983) 14,
pp. 252–9; Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih [Hsu¨eh-chin t’ao-yu¨an 1806 ed.; 1922 ed.] (c. 1298; Taipei, 1965)
pieh-chi, pp. 38b–39a; Richard L. Davis, Court and family in Sung China, 960–1279: Bureaucratic success
and kinship fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou (Durham, N.C.,1986), pp. 95–105; John W. Chaffee, Branches
of heaven: A history of the imperial clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 202–4; Charles A.
Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities: Sung foreign policy, 1217–1234,” in China among equals: The
Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley, Calif.,1983), pp. 204–
39. For an interesting but questionable account, see Sung-chi san-ch’ao cheng-yao [Shou-shan ko ts’ung-shu
n.d. ed.] (Taipei, 1968) 1, pp. 1a–b.
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Fu. He promptly informed the court of the affair. Shih Mi-yu¨an, however, had
already dispatched the Palace Guard to Hu-chou with specific instructions, so
it is alleged, to execute Chao Hung. Chao Hung was captured and died by
strangulation. From beginning to end, the incident scarcely lasted two weeks.
Virtually all extant source materials are highly biased against Shih Mi-yu¨an.
Most writers, especially those from the Ming dynasty, denounced Shih as an
assassin and go to great lengths to extol the moral virtues of Chao Hung.2 These
writers, pointing to the spontaneous character and small scale of the rebellion,
as well as noting the duress involved in Chao Hung’s initial submission to the
rebels and his voluntary role in their suppression, present Shih Mi-yu¨an’s dras-
tic response as savagely inhumane and unjustified. But these critics emphasize
only one side of the story. There is also evidence implicating Chao Hung. First,
although responsibility for the outbreak is placed solely with the P’an cousins,
once imperial robes were thrust upon Chao Hung, the prefect of Hu-chou
reportedly led a sizable entourage of official colleagues to the prefectural office
to submit their congratulations to the would-be emperor. By their conduct,
they too became implicated in the rebellion. If they had believed the incident
was truly hatched by a tiny band of politically insignificant actors who lacked
the enthusiastic support of the prince, such high-level endorsement would
have been inconceivable. Second, the outbreak is portrayed as spontaneous,
but the rebels by their own admission were in contact with Li Ch’u¨an some
three hundred to four hundred miles away in central Shantung. Such distant
communication also involved crossing the Sung-Chin border at a time of war,
so the rebels must have established a link with Li Ch’u¨an long before the
incident.
If the rebels were in contact with Li Ch’u¨an, then the spontaneity claimed
in later accounts is not credible. Nor is support from an eminent Li Ch’u¨an a
reasonable expectation for illiterate fishermen without some advance encour-
agement from Chao Hung. The prince must have given the rebels at least tacit
support from early on. However, Chao Hung is presented as a moderating force
among the rebels, one whose concern for the well-being of Empress Yang2 and
Shih Mi-yu¨an is remarkably noble, especially in the context of their having
aggressively intervened to deny him the throne only a few months earlier. Such
magnanimity completely contradicts Chao Hung’s character prior to this. As
noted in the preceding chapter, his uncontrollable temper and lack of dis-
cretion as imperial son, which included threats to banish Shih Mi-yu¨an and
conflicts with Empress Yang2, had made influential enemies for him. Neither
2 On Ming and Ch’ing dynasty interpretations of the succession controversy, see Richard L. Davis, “Evo-
lution of an historical stereotype for the Southern Sung – the case against Shih Mi-yu¨an,” in Ryu¯ Shiken
hakuse sho¯ju kinen: So¯-shi kenkyu¯ ronshu¯, ed. Kinugawa Tsuyoshi (Kyoto, 1989), pp. 357–86.
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moderate nor forgiving, Chao Hung had despised the chief councilor, whose
intervention in the accession could only have deepened Chao Hung’s enmity
toward him. To be sure, a glaring contradiction exists between depictions of
Chao Hung’s extreme personality prior to 1225 and accounts of his “moderate”
role in the rebellion.
In effect, Chao Hung in death appears far nobler than he did in life. For
the first time, he won sympathy from many men who had said nothing in his
defense five months earlier, when his royal inheritance was snatched away.
Differing accounts of the incident in Hu-chou rushed through the capi-
tal like floodwaters. Memorials of protest inundated the court. One rumor
blamed Chao Hung’s death on a retainer of Shih Mi-yu¨an, someone specif-
ically instructed by the councilor to assassinate the prince.3 One youthfully
intemperate scholar, Teng Jo-shui (chin-shih 1220), submitted an impassioned
memorial accusing the councilor of outright sedition and demanded his exe-
cution. Not incidentally, Teng also charged Shih Mi-yu¨an with forging Ning-
tsung’s testament (i-shu) on the eve of the emperor’s death.4 This was an issue
no other official dared to raise, let alone publicize, owing to its implications
concerning the legitimacy of Li-tsung himself.
Most official protests, while less offensively worded, were nonetheless
scathingly critical. The complaints of Wei Liao-weng, a Tao-hsu¨eh proponent
with a long history of conflict with Shih Mi-yu¨an, focused not on the legit-
imacy of the succession itself, but on the moral and political implications of
the conflict in Hu-chou. Wei stressed that events at Hu-chou reflected a much
larger problem, the political instability resulting from Shih Mi-yu¨an’s dom-
inance and seemingly interminable tenure as chief councilor.5 For those who
agreed with Wei Liao-weng, Shih Mi-yu¨an had become more than a political
liability for the court – he was a bad moral influence on the impressionable
new emperor. But perhaps the most incisive criticism came from Chen Te-hsiu,
then vice-minister of rites, an individual known for cooperating with Shih Mi-
yu¨an despite policy differences. Sharing with Wei Liao-weng a firm moralistic
outlook, Chen Te-hsiu was troubled by Li-tsung’s cold indifference toward his
stepbrother in refusing to appoint an heir for Chao Hung following the death
of Chao’s only son so that Chao Hung’s lineage would not be extinguished
and ritual sacrifices to the dead prince could be performed. Chen felt that this
refusal betrayed an alarming deficiency in the fraternal affection that was a
cardinal virtue of Confucian morality.6 This theme of fraternal devotion, and
3 Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1983) 14, p. 253; HTC (1958) 163, p. 4427.
4 SS 455, pp. 13378–81; HTC (1958) 163, pp. 4435–6.
5 SS 437, pp. 12967–8.
6 SS 437, pp. 12961–2; HTC (1958) 163, pp. 4427–8, 4439–41.
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the role of the emperor as paragon of that virtue, runs through many other
memorials, and overshadows all concern for the rebellion at Hu-chou or even
for the death of Chao Hung. Clearly, this issue had been seized upon by oppo-
nents of Shih Mi-yu¨an and politicized to implicate the new emperor as well.
Chen Te-hsiu had pressed for an open investigation of the Hu-chou incident.
His request was firmly denied.
Rather than placate the critics, Li-tsung aggravated them. On first learning
of Chao Hung’s death, he suspended court for a day and considered posthumous
honors. Yet within months, not only was Chao Hung posthumously demoted
to duke, his old titular status, but he was buried without honors on a straw
mat. Chao Hung’s demotion coincided with the elevation of Shih Mi-yu¨an to
grand preceptor. Li-tsung, no doubt, intended the latter move to demonstrate
his continued confidence in the councilor. In the view of Shih Mi-yu¨an critics,
however, to demote Chao Hung, a perceived innocent victim of circumstance,
while bestowing high honors upon his executioner, appeared morally unac-
ceptable. Shih Mi-yu¨an declined the tribute, but this did not appease those in
the outer court, who continued their denunciations. Two memorials from Hu
Meng-yu¨ (1185–1226), then a minor executive at the Ministry of Personnel,
drew much sympathy.7 In justifying his appeal for compassion, Hu com-
pared the court’s treatment of Chao Hung to the treatment afforded another
ill-fated Sung prince, Chao T’ing-mei (947–84), brother of T’ai-tsu and T’ai-
tsung. Chao T’ing-mei had been suspected of sedition, exiled to Fang-chou,
and demoted in rank from prince to duke. When news of Chao T’ing-mei’s
death reached the capital, T’ai-tsung was moved to restore his princely status.
Reflecting on this early precedent of magnanimity, Hu Meng-yu¨’s memo-
rials, without the malice of many other petitions, made a strong plea for
compassion.
Despite such appeals, the court’s response was rigid. Shih Mi-yu¨an had
always been a man of compromise, not inclined to confrontation, so this new
firmness may reflect the emperor’s wishes. With the now twenty-year-old Li-
tsung attempting to prove his worth, compromise with the forces of opinion
was untimely: the emperor could not afford to appear weak lest the bureaucracy
become unmanageable. In consequence, the court used the Censorate to silence
the critics. By the end of 1225, Teng Jo-shui, Wei Liao-weng, and Chen Te-
hsiu were all censured and demoted. The forty-one-year-old Hu Meng-yu¨,
stripped of official status, was exiled to a distant Kwangsi, where he died
the next year of dysentery. His death was widely thought unjust within the
civil service and cost Shih Mi-yu¨an many supporters. Ch’iao Hsing-chien, for
7 Hu Meng-yu¨ and Hu Chih-jou, Hsiang-t’ai shou-mo (1225; Taipei, 1965–70); SS 244, pp. 8666–70.
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example, had served under Shih in various capacities prior to 1225 and the
two were apparently quite cordial, yet Ch’iao Hsing-chien joined those in the
outer court protesting the posthumous humiliation of Chao Hung. Members
of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s own kin group similarly voiced their opposition. A cousin,
Shih Mi-kung, demanded that the spirit of Chao Hung be given rest through
proper burial and adoption of a male heir.8 In effect, the Chao Hung incident
provided moralists long opposed to Shih Mi-yu¨an with precisely the issue
they needed to mobilize official opinion against him. The incident had in turn
shattered the broad alliance established by Shih Mi-yu¨an following the death
of Han T’o-chou, an alliance of politicians and Tao-hsu¨eh proponents that had
weakened over the years but had still been alive. Relying on only a handful of
close friends, Shih Mi-yu¨an became “isolated on high.”
In the end, dissidents could not be silenced by demotion and exile. They
would soon be emboldened by other events. The early years of the Li-tsung
reign were visited by natural disasters of every variety: floods in Huai-nan
and Che-hsi, devastating fires at Ch’u-chou and Ch’i-chou2, an earthquake
not far from Lin-an, and massive flooding in Szechwan following the rup-
ture of a mountain. The heavens proved equally disquieted. Falling stars were
frequently reported, and the path of Venus (chin-hsing) was described as incon-
stant. Many officials, making the traditional assumption that disruptions in
nature reflect disharmony among humans, were quick to suggest a connection
between the natural events and Chao Hung’s posthumous treatment. Accord-
ing to Yeh Wei-tao (chin-shih 1220), later named a professor at the Imperial
University, Chao Hung’s ch’i (life force) had not dispersed, owing to Chao’s
improper burial and the absence of an heir to conduct ritual sacrifices to him,
and this ch’i was wreaking havoc throughout the empire. Others concurred
and pleaded for appropriate atonement.9 The court refused, at least for Shih
Mi-yu¨an’s remaining eight years, and the controversy continued to smolder.
Such inflexibility may appear petty minded, but there was more at stake. The
naming of an heir for Chao Hung could lead to a future crisis if the adopted
son proved politically ambitious and coveted the throne denied his adopted
father. The cautious Shih Mi-yu¨an could not bring himself to take that risk.
For the sake of the young emperor, if not for his own political security, he
made a decision that cost his reputation dearly. He would go down in history
as the councilor whose main accomplishment was the murder and humiliation
of a royal prince. Shih Mi-yu¨an’s reputation might well have been salvaged by
an imaginative, successful border policy, but Sung’s foreign enemies proved
unaccommodating.
8 SS 417, pp. 12489–92; 423, p. 12637.
9 SS 438, pp. 12986–7; 434, p. 12900; HTC (1958) 163, p. 4434.
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The loyalist outbreak
Border hostilities had subsided somewhat when Li-tsung took the throne. The
Chin braced themselves for a final showdown with the Mongols after striking
a peace agreement with the Hsi Hsia in late 1224 that ended their foolhardy
war. The Mongols had withdrawn briefly from the region, but were again in
full force at Hsi Hsia borders by early 1226 to begin their final assault on
that empire. With Temu¨jin (Chinggis khan) in personal command of Mongol
armies, the Hsi Hsia capital fell within a year.10 The concentration of Mongol
energies on the Hsi Hsia gave the Chin a respite of sorts. The death of Temu¨jin
in the summer of 1227 in the midst of the Hsi Hsia campaign must also have
come as welcome news. Beyond a lull in fighting, it brought the prospect of
a succession dispute that might set contending Mongol camps against one
another. The Chin made new peace overtures, and the Mongols, by ignoring
them, implied an inevitable resumption of hostilities. For the Sung, which
in the mid-1220s had squandered valuable energy on domestic issues, recent
developments were ominous. Mongol acquisition of the Hsi Hsia domain
placed them in proximity to northern Szechwan. Worse yet, any hiatus in
fighting to the north might free the Chin to resume hostilities against the
south. Conflict with either the Chin or Mongols was seen as inevitable by
many Sung statesmen, but Shih Mi-yu¨an, clinging to his old ambivalence in
foreign affairs, simply chose to reinforce border defenses while denying that
there was a serious military challenge.
The beleaguered Chin posed only a modest threat to the south by this time,
but Sung China had other menaces to confront. In the preceding chapter,
mention was made of the preponderance of rebel bands in Shantung, some
claiming allegiance with Sung, and others asserting their autonomy from the
Chin in the aftermath of Mongol incursions. With the Chin seemingly on the
verge of extinction, the Sung could not but reassess its policies toward these
loyalists in Shantung. To exclude the Mongols from the northeast and perhaps
even reclaim the territory for itself, the Sung court needed an early foothold
in the region and loyalists could provide the means.
Shantung activists, anxious to procure material assistance from the south and
to legitimate their own activities, were happy to acquiesce to the Sung court,
and the court had much to gain from the arrangement. Apart from providing
10 For details, see H. Desmond Martin, “The Mongol wars with Hsi Hsia (1205–1227),” Journal of the
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Nos. 3–4 (1942), pp. 195–228; Li Tse-fen, Yu¨an-shih
hsin-chiang (Taipei, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 491–510; and Ruth W. Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge
history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C.
Twitchett (New York, 1994), pp. 205–14.
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nominal Sung authority over the Shantung region, the arrangement enabled
the Sung to deploy loyalists in the south, as in the case of Li Ch’u¨an, to assist
in defending the Sung-Chin border. Although Shih Mi-yu¨an showed little
interest in venturesome military undertakings and extended aid only under
pressure from border officials, the limited assistance would steadily expand.
By the late 1220s, conferral of handsome subsidies and lofty titles on loyalists
in the north became established policy. The court honored Li Ch’u¨an, whose
territory now stretched from I-tu in a southeasterly direction along the coast,
as regional commandant, and P’eng I-pin (d. 1225) became military director,
with control centering on western Shantung and extending toward Ta-ming.
The total cost of loyalist subsidies is uncertain, yet official records indicate
that in 1224, as court support began to increase, the armies of Li Ch’u¨an and
P’eng I-pin drew subsidies of some three hundred thousand strings of cash.11
In exchange for its largesse, the Sung court expected loyalists to defer to the
authority of Sung border commanders, a demand that irritated some loyalists.
For the Sung court, the most difficult loyalist was Li Ch’u¨an.12 Under
Ning-tsung, through a clever combination of conquest and alliance, Li Ch’u¨an
had proven himself a valued asset to the south, but his own ambitions had
undermined his usefulness to the Sung. As early as 1222, he began trying to
eliminate neighboring loyalists in the northeast, which forced some would-
be loyalists into the arms of the Mongols. Li also proceeded to harass Sung
border authorities. Among the numerous military supervisors from the region
of the eastern Huai River, Chia She had achieved greater success than most at
coordinating loyalists and subordinating them to Sung command. Chia She
was realistic about the loyalties of such groups. He once complained of Shih
Mi-yu¨an’s excessive generosity toward Li Ch’u¨an, and in this way implied
that loyalists in general, but especially Li Ch’u¨an, were scarcely better than
brigands, of potential value to be sure, but also a potentially dangerous source
of future trouble.13 Chia She’s death in 1223 curtailed the Sung’s limited
success with the loyalist movements. Succeeding supervisors were sometimes
contentious and at other times ingratiating toward loyalists, in either event
weakening the hand of the Sung court. Hsu¨ Kuo (d. 1225) who had been a
minor officer before becoming a military supervisor, lacked Chia She’s extensive
experience in negotiations, and his hostility toward Li Ch’u¨an was a matter of
11 HTC (1958) 162, p. 4421.
12 Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 107–10; the chapter “Nan Sung Chin Yu¨an chien ti Shan-
tung chung-i-chu¨n yu¨ Li Ch’u¨an,” in Sun K’o-k’uan, Meng-ku Han-chu¨n chi Han wen-hua yen-chiu (Taipei,
1958), pp. 11–43; Sun K’o-k’uan, Yu¨an-tai Han wen-hua chih huo-tung (Taipei, 1968), pp. 65–83; SS
476–7; Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1983) 9, pp. 157–64; Ch’ien Shih-sheng, Nan Sung shu (c. 1590; n.p.,
1792) 44, pp. 1a–10b; 54, pp. 3b–4a.
13 SS 403, p. 12209.
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public record. Chia She had perceived the Shantung activist as arrogant and
unruly, but not altogether disloyal; Hsu¨ Kuo, however, considered Li Ch’u¨an
totally self-serving and treacherous. Shih Mi-yu¨an seems to have reasoned that
the forceful personality Hsu¨ Kuo commanded at the border might intimidate
and perhaps humble Li Ch’u¨an, which would explain his appointment of Hsu¨
Kuo. If this was the case, Shih was gravely mistaken. As tension between Hsu¨
and Li increased, Li Ch’u¨an instigated a mutiny in the border town of Ch’u-
chou, and Hsu¨ Kuo died in flight. This challenge to Sung authority on Sung
territory occurred in early spring of 1225, only a month after the uprising of
the deposed Chao Hung at Hu-chou.14
Even before the Ch’u-chou mutiny, the Li Ch’u¨an threat must have been
apparent. The rebels at Hu-chou, in turning to Shantung for assistance against
the Sung court, had demonstrated that the possibility of Li Ch’u¨an’s duplicity
was common knowledge. Several months after the Hu-chou uprising, one of
its leaders, rebel P’an Jen, surfaced at Ch’u-chou, apparently en route to Shan-
tung. His cover exposed, he was captured and sent to Lin-an for execution. The
linkage between Li Ch’u¨an and the Hu-chou insurgents increased pressures in
Lin-an to act against the Shantung leader. Chao K’uei (1186–1266) and Chao
Fan, sons of the eminent commander Chao Fang, had boldly advocated a north-
ern expedition even before 1225. Ch’en Hsu¨n, nephew of Shih Mi-yu¨an and
erudite of ceremonials, now similarly demanded firm action. Even the ordinar-
ily moderate Ch’iao Hsing-chien took a militant stand in this case, recognizing
that further indulgence of Li Ch’u¨an might undermine Sung authority on a
much larger scale. Finally, the military director of the main insurgent group
in western Shantung, P’eng I-pin, outraged at Li Ch’u¨an’s duplicity, joined
Sung authorities in conspiring against his neighbor, Li Ch’u¨an. But, the con-
spiracy ended with P’eng I-pin’s untimely death later in the year 1225.15 As
had occurred with Wu Hsi’s uprising of 1207 in Szechwan, Shih Mi-yu¨an may
have hoped that P’eng I-pin would succeed in resolving the loyalist threat
internally, which would have spared Shih the risks of direct intervention.
When Peng’s death ruled this out, Shih Mi-yu¨an settled for an unseemly but
convenient appeasement. He appointed accommodating commanders to the
strategic post at Ch’u-chou and continued to provision the armies of Li Ch’u¨an.
However, Li Ch’u¨an’s position in the region was not stable. In the spring
of 1226, the Mongols trapped Li Ch’u¨an at I-tu, his base in central Shantung.
The encirclement, lasting over a year, permitted the Sung court to strengthen
14 SS 476, pp. 13825–7; HTC (1958) 162, p. 4418; 163, pp. 4430–2.
15 References are in SS 417, pp. 12499–500, 12505–6; 423, p. 12639; 417, p. 12492; 476, p. 13828; HTC
(1958) 163, pp. 4436–7; Sun K’o-k’uan, Meng-ku ch’u-ch’i chih chu¨n-lu¨eh yu¨ Chin chih peng-k’uei (Taipei,
1955), pp. 65–81; Hu Chao-hsi et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, (Ch’eng-tu, 1992), pp. 36–41.
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its hand in southern Shantung, where the remnants of Li Ch’u¨an’s army had
taken refuge. The time seemed right for confrontation. Halting provisions to
Li Ch’u¨an from the south, the new prefect of Ch’u-chou, Liu Cho (d. 1227),
moved quickly to mobilize opponents of Li Ch’u¨an against Li’s remnant forces.
The ploy failed because of the resourcefulness of Yang Miao-chen, the wife
of Li Ch’u¨an, who had temporarily taken command of Li’s armies and who
outmaneuvered Liu Cho and forced him to flee Ch’u-chou under cover of
night. His garrison went over to the rebels. Meanwhile, the year-long siege of
Li Ch’u¨an at I-tu had reduced the city’s population to a fraction of its original
several hundred thousand, yet cleverly Li Ch’u¨an was spared imminent defeat
by striking a deal with the Mongols. In exchange for formally relinquishing
the city, he received appointment as regional administrator (hsing-t’ai shang-
shu sheng) of Shantung. Shih Mi-yu¨an in response named Yao Ch’ung (d. 1227)
to be prefect of Ch’u-chou. Rather than attack, Yao tried to ingratiate himself
with Li Ch’u¨an. The gesture did not appease Yang Miao-chen or Li Fu2,
brother of Li Ch’u¨an. Within six months, Yao Ch’ung was driven out of Ch’u-
chou, fleeing an assassination plot hatched by Yang Miao-chen and Li Fu2. In
effect, the rebels had overrun a vital city on the Sung border and they posed a
growing menace to the lower Huai region and especially to the strategically
vital Yang-chou, less than sixty miles to the south.
The mutiny at Ch’u-chou could not be sustained by Yang Miao-chen and
Li Fu2. A son and a concubine of Li Ch’u¨an had been killed in the fighting,
and when Li Ch’u¨an returned to retake the city in the early autumn of 1227,
he wore Mongol vestments as symbols of his new allegiance. The abortive
Ch’u-chou mutiny had been led by Shih Ch’ing (d. 1227), a former Li Ch’u¨an
subordinate, with the aid of a local Sung commander. Li Ch’u¨an quickly won
back the city, ending its month-long autonomy, and Shih Ch’ing died at his
hands. The overconfident Li Ch’u¨an now began to assemble a naval force in
preparation for war against the Sung. For the next two years, Shih Mi-yu¨an
tried to use lofty titles and royal stipends to appease the Shantung leader;
he continued to ignore the appeals of colleagues to take up arms against Li
Ch’u¨an. For his part, Li Ch’u¨an rejected the Sung court’s offers, showing that
he was fixed in his commitment to the Mongols. The inability of the Sung
court to control Li Ch’u¨an’s ambitions was most glaringly apparent in the early
1230s, as Li Ch’u¨an expanded his territory in the direction of Yang-chou, and
Shih Mi-yu¨an still did not abandon the policy of provisioning him.16
By late 1230, Li Ch’u¨an began a siege of T’ai-chou, sixty miles into Sung
territory and only twelve miles east of Yang-chou. The sixty-six-year-old
16 SS 477, pp. 13842–3; HTC (1958) 165, pp. 4492–3, 4496.
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Shih Mi-yu¨an still did not declare war himself, but deferred the honor to
Cheng Ch’ing-chih, his close confidant and assisting executive at the Bureau of
Military Affairs. Once the decision to act was made, the court moved swiftly,
entrusting the brothers Chao K’uei and Chao Fan with general command of the
punitive campaign. The showdown occurred at Yang-chou, where the rebels
reportedly numbered several hundred thousand. Even assuming the induction
of nearby residents into military service, this is not a believable estimate; the
armies of Li Ch’u¨an appear never to have exceeded thirty thousand men. Even
so, a force of thirty thousand was not to be taken lightly, and the Chao brothers,
no doubt with a force of equal if not greater size, broke the rebel blockade and
destroyed much of Li’s army. Defeat for Li Ch’u¨an was resounding. He died
on 18 February 1231. Sung armies moved north, recapturing border towns
such as Ch’u-chou and Huai-an and purging them of Li Ch’u¨an partisans. The
remnants of the Shantung army returned north, and were never again a serious
threat.
The speed with which Sung armies eradicated the Li Ch’u¨an menace reflected
poorly on the judgment of Shih Mi-yu¨an by making his earlier reluctance to
act appear unwarranted. Some might conclude that the military folly of Han
T’o-chou a generation earlier had left Shih Mi-yu¨an a prisoner of histori-
cal precedent, unable to grasp the differences of past and present and to act
accordingly. But the issues confronting Shih Mi-yu¨an went far beyond the old
choices of aggressive intervention or passive neglect.
Beyond the Chin response to Sung actions in Shantung, the Sung had to
consider Mongol reactions as well. Early on in their conquest of Chin, the
Mongols held territory along the western border of Shantung and aggressively
encouraged the activities of local rebels to undermine Chin authority. By 1221
the Mongols had won the favor of Chang Lin2, a rebel lured by Li Ch’u¨an into
the Sung camp two years earlier, who abruptly abandoned the Sung when per-
sonal rivalry divided the two men. Chang Lin2’s base of operations centered on
northwest Shantung and extended into Ho-pei East circuit. In 1223, however,
Chang Lin2 abandoned the Mongols and submitted once more to the Sung.
The Sung court could hardly turn him away, although entering into a bidding
war with the Mongols in Shantung could have costly repercussions. Sung rela-
tions with another loyalist, P’eng I-pin, proved even more sensitive. With a
base south of Chang Lin2’s, P’eng I-pin repeatedly engaged Mongol armies as
he expanded his territory north into Ta-ming. Holding Sung rank and firmly
committed to the Sung court, he could only be viewed by the Mongols as a
Sung agent. Chang Lin2 and P’eng I-pin may have brought the Sung into
indirect conflict with the Mongols, but the use of Sung regular troops in the
suppression of Li Ch’u¨an risked, for the first time, direct conflict between the
Mongols and the Sung. In this context, Shih Mi-yu¨an had good reason to act
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with caution, for the Sung could ill-afford to incur another powerful enemy
and trigger yet another war.
However defensible, Shih Mi-yu¨an’s caution may have forced Li Ch’u¨an into
the waiting arms of the Mongols. The Yu¨an dynasty (1260–1368) compilers
of the Sung dynastic history (Sung shih) have no high regard for Li Ch’u¨an. An
uncommonly long biography, subsumed under “treasonous officials,” portrays
Li Ch’u¨an as a self-serving traitor from the outset. The modern historian Sun
K’o-k’uan has challenged this view, demonstrating rather convincingly that
official chroniclers were biased against loyalist groups in general. They even
denied a biography to the one Shantung activist who remained loyal to the
Sung court until the end, P’eng I-pin, seeking to exclude any loyalist who
failed to fit their Li Ch’u¨an stereotype of duplicity. Sun K’o-k’uan and others
characterize Shantung loyalists as more than just opportunists; they see them
as patriots imbued with “ethnic consciousness” and seeking to restore majority
rule to China. The failure of the loyalist mission may relate, in part, to the
destructive tensions among rivals in Shantung, but the transformation of Sung
loyalists into traitors is blamed largely upon Shih Mi-yu¨an.17 More committed
to securing the south than regaining the north, and distrustful of armies not
directly responsible to him, Shih Mi-yu¨an sought simply to harness loyalist
armies for the Sung’s advantage. Li Ch’u¨an, quite simply, found the terms
unacceptable.
Notwithstanding the need to reassess the loyalist question independent
of court historians, Sun K’o-k’uan’s view appears as yet another extreme. Li
Ch’u¨an may have begun as a source of loyalist unity, but after 1221 his preoc-
cupation with his own territorial expansion and dominance of the Shantung
region made him the principal source of division. Ambition of this sort cannot
be easily blamed on the Sung court. Moreover, Li Ch’u¨an’s submission to the
Mongols and his war against the Sung are curious moves for an “ethnically
conscious” individual. Autonomy, after all, was not altogether unfeasible in
an area as isolated as Shantung. Yu¨an historians may have treated Li Ch’u¨an
harshly because of the duplicity of his adopted son, Li T’an, several decades
later, rather than judging Li Ch’u¨an on his own merits. It would also be equally
erroneous to portray Li Ch’u¨an as a tragic hero. Better suited for that role is
perhaps P’eng I-pin, the hapless loyalist who, in the face of many hardships,
died while trying to oust the Mongols from Ho-pei West. Trapped between
Li Ch’u¨an to the east, the Chin to the west, the Mongols to the northwest, and
the Mongol puppets Yen Shih and Chang Lin2 to the north, P’eng’s position
was far more tenuous, yet never once did he abandon the Sung, even in the face
17 Sun, Meng-ku ch’u-ch’i chih chu¨n-lu¨eh yu¨ Chin chih peng-k’uei, pp. 65–81; Huang K’uan-ch’ung, Nan Sung
shih-tai k’ang Chin ti i-chu¨n (Taipei, 1988), pp. 224–33.
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of the Sung’s annoyingly short-sighted policies. Li Ch’u¨an, a totally different
character, was ruined by his own uncontrolled arrogance and ambition.
foreign policy
The strategic see-saw
During the Ning-tsung era, Sung-Mongol relations were characterized more
by ambivalence than by relations between friend or foe. Despite long-standing
Sung-Chin tensions, few Sung officials promoted an alliance with the Mongols
against the Jurchen. A forceful performance in the brief K’ai-hsi war that had
been concluded only a few years before, in 1208, had clearly demonstrated
that Chin military power was far from spent. The expectation that the Chin
could arrest the Mongol advance was not totally fanciful. Few in the Sung
capital had seriously entertained the ominous prediction of Chen Te-hsiu in
1214, who warned that the Mongol menace would likely become the future
Sung peril. Shih Mi-yu¨an had not departed from his long-standing policy of
noninvolvement. Even the reopening of hostilities along the Sung-Chin border
did not substantially affect Sung-Mongol relations. The Mongols had initiated
overtures to the Sung as early as 1214, although it was not until 1221 that
the Sung court conducted its first successful mission to their encampments.
Coinciding with a massive Chin offensive against the Sung, the mission was
intended to remind the Chin of the risks of fighting on two fronts. The next
serious effort at dialogue occurred in 1225, in the midst of a major Mongol
drive against Li Ch’u¨an.18 Outside of this, the Sung made, at most, only half-
hearted efforts to expand its dialogue with the Mongols and put pressure on
the Jurchen. However, in 1231, when a Mongol envoy arrived at the Sung
border to negotiate the passage of their armies through Huai-nan en route to
the Chin capital K’ai-feng, he was killed by Sung patrols.19 The action, while
probably not sanctioned by the court, represented a provocation requiring
military retaliation. An ambivalent Sung court, it appears, did not bother
with an apology.
The retaliation that followed was not the first time that Mongol and Sung
armies had clashed.20 In their conquest of the Hsi Hsia in the summer of 1227,
the Mongols had attacked the Chin empire’s western flank at strategically
vital Feng-hsiang and Shang-chou, only miles from the Sung border. Nearby
18 Sung Lien et al., Yu¨an shih [Po-na-pen 1930–7 ed.] (1370; Peking, 1976) 1, pp. 21, 23; Hu et al., Sung
Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 17–26; Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,” pp. 218–19.
19 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 2, p. 31; HTC (1958) 165, pp. 4501–2.
20 Li T’ien-ming, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih (Taipei, 1988), pp. 38–45, 75–86.
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Sung prefectures of Feng-chou, Hsi-ho-chou, and Chieh-chou were also hit.
No rationale was given for entering Sung territory. On his deathbed, Temu¨jin
reportedly acknowledged that speedy annihilation of the Chin required attack-
ing K’ai-feng from the south, because the swift, wide Yellow River protecting
the Chin capital on the north made a direct north-to-south frontal assault
unmanageable for his cavalry forces.21 Temu¨jin’s lieutenants may have forced
their way through Sung lands for lack of time or patience to win a negotiated
passage, but this cannot explain their attacks as far south as Chieh-chou and
Mien-chou, some sixty miles into the Sung domain. Perhaps the Mongols,
having depopulated and destroyed most of the Tangut empire, merely came
for booty. Whatever their motives, they soon returned home to battle over the
succession to Temu¨jin.
O¨go¨dei (r. 1229–41), Temu¨jin’s successor, has been portrayed as a man of
sound judgment and impressive administrative talent, more committed to
political consolidation than his father the warrior had been.22 Despite the
execution of Li Ch’u¨an by Sung armies, O¨go¨dei chose not to resume hostilities
against the Sung. In the summer of 1231, just months after Li Ch’u¨an’s death,
O¨go¨dei dispatched an emissary to Lin-an to negotiate the passage of Mongol
troops through Sung territory. That the mission ended in failure was bad
enough, but during the return trip home the envoy was killed by an assassin,
allegedly a Sung commander at Mien-chou. In response, Mongol armies overran
Szechwan and penetrated as far south as Lang-chou, some one hundred and
eighty miles into the interior of Sung territory. The rapid strike, which cost
the Sung countless civilian lives, lasted no more than a month and appears to
have been largely a show of force, perhaps even a forage for booty, but certainly
not a serious effort at conquest. This is implied by the commissioning of a
second Mongol envoy who specifically sought provisions. The Mongols must
have assumed that the Sung would relent only under duress. What is most
perplexing about these developments in 1231 is Shih Mi-yu¨an’s intransigence.
For a councilor who favored accommodation over confrontation, he seems
hardly the type to forgo an opportunity to patch up differences. Anti-Mongol
sentiment in the south may have been a factor: Shih Mi-yu¨an had always been
more responsive to critics at home than to enemies abroad. With popular
passions running high against the Mongols in the aftermath of the Li Ch’u¨an
affair, the time was not right for a rapprochement.
Mounting tensions along the border and the emotional pressures they cre-
ated left the aging Shih Mi-yu¨an, according to some contemporary accounts,
21 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 1, p. 25.
22 Thomas T. Allsen, Mongol imperialism: The policies of the Grand Qan Mo¨ngke in China, Russia, and the Islamic
lands, 1251–1259 (Berkeley, Calif., 1987), pp. 18–44.
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so depressed that he attempted suicide.23 Court gossip of this sort should
always be viewed with skepticism, but it is known that the emperor, in Jan-
uary 1231, had reduced court attendance for Shih Mi-yu¨an to once every ten
days, an unmistakable sign of diminished vigor. Li-tsung also restored rank
and salary to prominent critics Chen Te-hsiu and Wei Liao-weng, men who
had been demoted six years earlier for challenging the posthumous treatment
of Chao Hung. It seemed to many that Shih Mi-yu¨an had begun to fall from
grace and that the emperor was on the verge of asserting himself. But it was not
so. Although politically revived, the critics received no appointments in the
capital. Nor did Li-tsung appoint a second councilor to share power with Shih
Mi-yu¨an. Routine administrative chores fell increasingly upon the shoulders of
Cheng Ch’ing-chih, assistant councilor since January 1231. As the chief coun-
cilor’s prote´ge´ and handpicked successor, Cheng represents largely an extension
of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s influence. Only death, which came in the autumn of 1233,
would end Shih’s marathon tenure as chief councilor.
Shih Mi-yu¨an’s legacy engendered hostility, not deference, from many of
his contemporaries, and malicious denunciation from later historians. Policy
failures aside, Shih Mi-yu¨an’s extraordinary tenure made unpopularity virtually
inevitable. In 1231 a collator at the Palace Library wrote:
[Your Majesty] has held the throne eight years now, but one never hears of things being
done [by You]. In the promotion and demotion of talent, initiation and renunciation of
political matters, all in the realm say, “This is the chief councilor’s will.”. . . . You may be
the Son of Heaven, lord of the people, yet starting with the court and extending throughout
the realm, all speak of the councilor and do not speak of the ruler.24
The memorialist does not attack specific policies, merely the dominance
that Shih Mi-yu¨an represented, overshadowing the throne. This theme figures
prominently in the criticisms of others as well. Wei Liao-weng, soon after
the councilor’s death, composed an emotional excoriation of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s
“eight failures.” The memorial, focusing principally on the recent trend toward
all-powerful ministers, concludes by advocating a division of bureaucratic
powers.25 Scant attention is paid to the councilor’s foreign policy or to his role
in the 1224 succession of Li-tsung; such issues are more compelling to critics
of the Ming and Ch’ing periods. Observers, contemporary and modern, rarely
credit Shih Mi-yu¨an with maintaining an enduring stability along the Sung-
Chin border and rarely commend him for successfully evading a premature
23 On Shih Mi-yu¨an’s last years, see Davis, Court and family in Sung of China, pp. 110–17.
24 HTC (1958) 165, pp. 4504–5.
25 Wei Liao-weng, Ho-shan hsien-sheng ta ch’u¨an-chi [Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1249; Taipei,
1979) 19, pp. 1a–18a.
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clash with Mongol armies.26 As neighboring empires crumbled around it, the
Sung retained a semblance of order and this owes much to the policies of Shih
Mi-yu¨an. He introduced no significant reforms to address the chronic military
and fiscal problems besetting the empire. He lacked either the imagination or
courage to do so. Reflecting his preoccupation with security and predictability,
the times were characterized by moderation, not by progress. A moderate Shih
Mi-yu¨an left no dramatic political legacy, yet his policies would affect the
dynasty for many years to come.
An unpropitious alliance
Mongol entreaties to the Sung to cooperate in exterminating the Jurchen
regime may have appealed to some in the south. But the alliance of a century
earlier between the Sung and the Jurchen against the Khitan had cost the Sung
the northern part of its empire. Mongol incursions into the south in 1227 and
1231, not to mention their devastation of Hsi Hsia and much of the north,
inhibited an entente, yet the Mongols wanted Sung cooperation and threatened
to use military action, if necessary, to coerce an otherwise recalcitrant Sung
court into an alliance.27 In the early months of 1232, having conquered the
Chin-controlled city of T’ang-chou, the Mongols advanced north to K’ai-feng
and encircled the Chin capital. The siege lasted nearly a year. High casualties
and cannibalism caused by famine were enough to undermine Chin resolve, but
the siege also produced an epidemic of massive proportions, allegedly claiming
over a million lives. Victory must have seemed imminent to the Mongols, yet
the Chin valiantly held on. K’ai-feng would eventually fall two years later,
but to accelerate their conquest the Mongols approached the Sung court at the
close of 1232 with a view to collaboration.
In anticipation of hostilities in the central border region, the Sung had reor-
ganized their military commands. The accomplished Meng Kung, a native of
Tsao-yang, became supreme commander of Ching-hsi circuit, and Shih Sung-
chih (1189–1257), a nephew of Councilor Shih Mi-yu¨an, became military
commissioner in chief for the Ching-hsi and Ching-hu circuits. Shih Sung-
chih’s views on border security closely resembled those of his uncle: a preoc-
cupation with stability that precluded adventurist intervention in the north.
His appointment at this critical juncture suggests the Sung court’s reaffir-
mation of the essentially defensive policies of his uncle. Still, in late 1232,
26 The exception among modern historians is Li T’ien-ming; see his Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 203–4.
27 Hu Chao-hsi, “Lu¨eh-lun Nan Sung mo-nien Ssu-ch’uan chu¨n-min k’ang-chi Meng-ku kuei-tsu ti tou-
cheng,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts’ung tseng-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming
and Ch’eng Ying-liu (Shanghai, 1982), pp. 374–409, especially p. 376.
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the Sung court authorized talks between its border officials and the envoy
Wang Chi, a Chinese literatus in the service of the Mongols. Shih Sung-chih
and Meng Kung directed the exchange near Hsiang-yang. The talks inspired
lots of fanfare and superficial goodwill but no agreement resulted. The details
are shrouded in secrecy, but in all likelihood the talks failed because of Sung
tactics of delay and evasion. In the interim, the Chin court had abandoned a
besieged K’ai-feng, and took refuge by late summer 1233 at Ts’ai-chou, a mere
forty miles from the Sung border. For Mongol decision makers, the move made
assistance from the south all the more pressing, if only to block the further
retreat of the Chin ruler (Ai-tsung, r. 1223–34). Negotiations intensified and
resulted in an informal agreement.28 The Mongols received some three hun-
dred thousand piculs of rice, twenty thousand fresh soldiers, and the Sung’s
commitment to join in the assault on Ts’ai-chou. In exchange, the Sung court
received vague promises of restoration of some territory in southern Honan. It
was a lopsided agreement, the Sung receiving nothing more for their valued
men and supplies than indefinite promises about the future.29
Sung and Chin armies clashed in late summer 1233 after nearly a decade of
relative inactivity along the border, and initial exchanges reflected well upon
Sung preparedness. Rumor had it that the Chin regional secretariat, Wu Hsien
(d. 1234), planned to open a southwesterly path to Szechwan as an escape
route for Emperor Ai-tsung. Wu crossed the Sung border near Teng-chou2
and attacked the nearby Kuang-hua commandery, a foray handily repulsed by
Meng Kung. In the interim, Shih Sung-chih led an offensive against T’ang-
chou, effectively isolating remaining Chin forces at Ts’ai-chou from reserves
at Teng-chou2. Inadequate men and provisions precluded a sustained Chin
resistance, and T’ang-chou collapsed. Shou-chou, to the east, fell to Sung
armies in late summer, giving the Sung a solid foothold in Honan. The Chin,
now trapped, were also denied the option of a negotiated settlement. Chin
envoys sent to discuss a possible truce with the Sung were turned back at
the border, an emphatic demonstration of the Sung court’s confidence in its
newfound strength.
The Sung campaign against Ts’ai-chou, launched in early November, was
commanded by Meng Kung.30 Mongol armies had attacked Ts’ai-chou in
28 On the negotiations, see Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 2, p. 32; 153, p. 3613; SS 412, pp. 12370–3; HTC
(1958) 166, p. 4528; 167, pp. 4546–7; Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,” pp. 218–25; Hu,
“Lu¨eh-lun Nan Sung mo-nien,” p. 376; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 48–55; Li, Sung
Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 129–42, 162–4.
29 See Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,” pp. 222–4, concerning the problems in the historical
record and attempts to understand Sung reasons for forming the alliance.
30 On the Ts’ai-chou conflict, see T’o-t’o, ed., Chin shih [Po-na-pen 1930–7 ed.] (1344; Peking, 1975)
18, pp. 400–3; SS 412, pp. 12369–80; Li Yu¨-t’ang, Chin-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1893; Peking, 1980),
pp. 787–97; Huang K’uan-ch’ung, “Meng Kung nien-p’u,” Shih yu¨an 4 (1973), pp. 79–135, especially
pp. 95–104; Li, Yu¨an-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 1, pp. 558–70.
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October, but heavy casualties forced them to wait for the arrival of reinforce-
ments from the Sung. Ts’ai-chou, only half the size of K’ai-feng, contained pre-
cious few human and material resources, making protracted resistance impos-
sible. Within three months of its arrival there and only weeks after the Mongol
siege began, the Chin court had depleted their provisions and the population
was reduced to cannibalism. After filling a lake near the city walls with bundles
of sticks and reeds, invaders stormed Ts’ai-chou in full force. Mass desertions
followed, and the city fell on 9 February 1234. Emperor Ai-tsung committed
suicide, while the loyal few made their last stand in the city’s streets and alleys.
Meng Kung retrieved the Chin imperial seals and part of Ai-tsung’s charred
corpse, testaments to his victory, which he turned over to Shih Sung-chih. The
Sung quickly established military garrisons at T’ang-chou and Teng-chou2.
With the exception of Shou-chou, this was the only Chin territory acquired
by the south.
Before the Chin demise at Ts’ai-chou, and even before conclusion of the
Sung-Mongol alliance, an ambitious few in Lin-an had begun to speculate
about the limits of their government’s involvement in the north. In Septem-
ber 1233 and a few weeks before Shih Mi-yu¨an’s death, the court received a
memorial from Wu Yung (chin-shih 1208), a Szechwan native with midlevel
metropolitan experience under Shih Mi-yu¨an. The narrative leaves little doubt
that some considered an alliance with the Mongols as merely the first step in
a general reconquest of the northern territory. Wu Yung, who dismissed the
notion as foolhardy, compared it to “squandering what our empire has stored
away to acquire land of no use.”31
In the aftermath of the Ts’ai-chou victory, the speculations of a few flared
into heated debate over the wisdom of further expansion. The source of the
proposal cannot be determined, but by early 1234 the Sung court began to seri-
ously entertain the notion, preposterous though it may seem, of dispatching
troops to capture the three former capitals of the Northern Sung, K’ai-feng,
Ying-t’ien, and Lo-yang.32 If implemented, this plan would represent a dra-
matic departure from the cautious foreign policy of the past. The inclination
to intervene reflects, to some historians, Li-tsung’s misguided effort to assert
himself after nearly a decade of domination by his excessively pragmatic coun-
cilor Shih Mi-yu¨an. Others consider intervention to reflect the fundamentally
incompatible views of Shih Mi-yu¨an and Cheng Ch’ing-chih, the latter being
less preoccupied with political entrenchment and more committed to the irre-
dentist cause. Neither explanation is wholly convincing. With the legitimacy
of his succession in question, Li-tsung may have seen in the move a grand
31 Wu Yung, Ho-lin chi [Ssu-k’u ch’u¨an-shu, Wen-yu¨an ko 1779 ed.] (early 13th c.; Taipei, 1969) 18,
pp. 8a–12a, especially p. 10b; 19, pp. 12b–20a.
32 Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 87–91; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 170–81.
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opportunity to prove himself deserving of the throne, but there is not the
slightest shred of historical evidence to suggest that the emperor genuinely
cared to assert himself. For the duration of his reign, Li-tsung delegated most
decision making to chief ministers, essentially sanctioning whatever policies
they recommended. As for Cheng Ch’ing-chih, his differences with Shih Mi-
yu¨an should not be exaggerated. There is nothing to document serious rifts
between the two over border policy. Admittedly, it may have been politically
expedient to distance himself from his highly unpopular predecessor, and a
more ambitious foreign policy might provide a convenient vehicle for so doing,
but Cheng Ch’ing-chih could have devised some less risky action to accomplish
the same objective. There is yet another reason to suspect that the emperor
and his new councilor, although perhaps tantalized by revanchist aspirations,
did not originally favor military intervention. Returning south immediately
after the Chin defeat, the troops of Meng Kung made little effort to retain a
military presence in southern Honan. Only a half year later, though, the Sung
court ordered troops north once again. A stunning reversal of court policy had
occurred.
Later chroniclers, with the advantage of historical hindsight, are inten-
tionally generous in recording the views of moderates while neglecting the
proponents of aggression. Even after accounting for historical bias of this sort,
we must still conclude that the vast majority of officialdom, and especially
court officials, opposed aggression.33 Assistant Councilors Ch’iao Hsing-chien,
Tseng Ts’ung-lung (chin-shih 1199), and Ch’en Kuei-i (1183–1234), all of
whom held concurrent appointments at the Bureau of Military Affairs, were in
complete agreement about the injudiciousness of sending troops north. Ch’en
Kuei-i, realizing that his council would go unheeded, resigned in protest.
Joining those who objected was Investigating Censor Li Tsung-mien (chin-shih
1205), who pointed to the tactical difficulty of provisioning troops in the north
where local supplies of food, strained by years of war, were almost nonexis-
tent. In candor, he exclaimed that “at this time it is impossible even to defend
[the south]. How is it possible to attempt invasion [of the north]?”34 His
fellow censor Tu Fan (1182–1245) concurred. Fiscal Overseer for Huai-nan
West, Wu Ch’ien (chin-shih 1217), commented, “Seizing [the north] may be
easy, but defending it will prove difficult.”35 A succession of other memori-
alists reminded the court of the vulnerability of Sung forces, the uselessness
33 On the abortive campaign, see SS 405, p. 12234; 412, pp. 12374, 12381; 417, pp. 12492–4; 418,
pp. 12516–17; Chou Mi, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1983) 5, pp. 77–80; Ch’en Pang-chan et al., Sung-shih chi-
shih pen-mo (1605; Peking, 1977) 92, pp. 1037–42; Huang Tsung-hsi et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an (1838;
Taipei, 1973) 73, p. 1278; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 53, pp. 3b, 6b; Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,”
pp. 225–30; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 181–8; Li, Yu¨an-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 176–82.
34 SS 405, p. 12234.
35 SS 418, p. 12516.
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of gaining barren land and depopulated cities, and perhaps most important,
the need to retain cordial relations with an unpredictable new northern neigh-
bor, the Mongols. Many of these memorialists possessed extensive experience,
as well as personal ties to the new councilor Cheng Ch’ing-chih, and their
arguments were well reasoned. Why then did the court support the minority
position in favor of an offensive and, in the process, annoy a sensitive bureau-
cracy at home and provoke a dangerous ally abroad? The change in policy
apparently stemmed from a rift between metropolitan advisors and regional
administrators.
Among advocates of aggression, the most vocal appears to have been Chao
K’uei, a commander of the army that had triumphed over Li Ch’u¨an in 1231.
In addition to an illustrious family background and distinguished record of
military service, Chao had personal credibility with Cheng Ch’ing-chih, his
one-time teacher. Chao K’uei was on equally good terms, it appears, with Chao
Shan-hsiang (chin-shih 1196), a highly decorated military leader whose status
as imperial clansman with affinal ties to the house of Shih Mi-yu¨an provided
an unusually wide array of contacts.
Chao K’uei advocated a firm, even aggressive, border policy. Long before Li
Ch’u¨an had presented a serious menace, Chao had urged the Sung court to use
force against the Shantung leader. Subsequently, Chao K’uei came to exemplify
the opinion of many within the military establishment, and especially among
commanders in the eastern part of the Yangtze River basin, where Chao had
gained his experience. Ch’u¨an Tzu-ts’ai, another prominent military figure who
had extensive experience in the northeast, also endorsed the interventionist
position.36 The Sung dynastic history identifies Tu Kao, prefect of the border
commandery of An-feng, as the only regional official who dared to oppose Chao
K’uei’s adventurism.37 Although the group typified by Chao K’uei were unlike
their colleagues in the capital in supporting a less timid and more aggressive
border policy, they were not all in agreement. Meng Kung, a commander in
the central part of Sung territory, refused to endorse the change in policy.
Even Chao Fan, elder brother of Chao K’uei, disassociated himself from the
aggressive proposal and later criticized his brother for having endangered the
empire.38 Thus neither a united military establishment nor a solid block of
36 The eminent Ch’ing historian Ch’ien Ta-hsin (1728–1804) insists that Chao K’uei and Ch’u¨an Tzu-ts’ai
were scapegoats for Cheng Ch’ing-chih, their political standing having been too modest to effect a
redirection of court policy. However, this ignores, first, the special influence derived from Chao K’uei’s
personal ties with the councilor, and, second, the important role of regional officials and commanders as
policy consultants for the court. See Ch’ien Ta-hsin, Nien-erh shih k’ao-i (1806; Ch’ang-sha, 1884) 80,
p. 10b.
37 SS 412, p. 12382.
38 SS 41, p. 803; 417, p. 12502; HTC (1958) 167, p. 4567.
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regional officials supported Chao K’uei and Ch’u¨an Tzu-ts’ai; the support they
did have apparently came from outside the capital, not from the court, and
largely from the eastern Yangtze region, not from central and western parts of
Sung territory. This is hardly coincidental.
Armies of the eastern Yangtze, in particular those of Chao K’uei and Chao
Fan, were probably not involved in the final campaign against the Chin at Ts’ai-
chou; they had no personal exposure to conditions in the region. Furthermore,
with the Mongol military presence weakest in the east, precisely where Sung
strength was greatest, Chao K’uei may have underestimated Mongol ability
to counter Sung aggression. Chao seems also to have reasoned that troops from
the south, once they moved north, would receive generous assistance from
the local Chinese populace, much as in Shantung. Perceptions such as these
may have inspired revanchists to press for a northern expedition. The euphoria
accompanying victory at Ts’ai-chou in early 1234 must have helped their case
as well.
Decision makers at the Sung court were confronted with new opportunities
suddenly available to them. In the eighth lunar month, the Sung sent a dele-
gation to offer sacrifices at the Eight Tombs, the burial place of Northern Sung
emperors in a remote spot northeast of Lo-yang. Having conducted no ritual
sacrifices there for over a century, the Sung court did not know the condition
of the tombs. Upon returning south, the delegates informed the court that
the tombs were in serious disrepair and that water inundated the surrounding
land. As Li-tsung listened, so chroniclers say, he heaved a deep sigh and fought
back tears.39 In this emotionally charged context, the court, surrendering to
sentiment, decided to dispatch armies north to recover the three capitals. The
decision was not calculated; it reflected in some measure the naive optimism
that the ancestral spirits would intervene on the side of humanity. Just two
months before the campaign, the emperor restored titular honors to his step-
brother, Chao Hung, and authorized sacrifices at his grave site. He honored
the widow of Chao Hung, living incognito as a nun in Shao-hsing, with an
esteemed title and, for good measure, a generous monthly stipend. Clearly,
Li-tsung wanted all the spirits, including the spirit of his disgraced brother,
to support this sacred mission.
In the summer of 1234, either in the sixth or eighth lunar month, the
Sung unleashed its armies.40 Ch’u¨an Tzu-ts’ai led a reported ten thousand
men from Lu-chou2 to K’ai-feng, encountering no significant resistance. En
39 SS 41, p. 803.
40 SS 41, p. 803, gives the eighth month of 1234 as the date of troop deployment; Chou Mi in Ch’i-tung
yeh-yu¨ (1983) 5, p. 77, gives the sixth month, as does Sung-shih ch’u¨an-wen Hsu¨ Tzu-chih t’ung-chien (early
14th c.; Taipei, 1969) 32, pp. 14a–b.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.013
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 21:48:56, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
862 richard l. davis
route, he passed through Shou-chou and Hao-chou, where he found once-
flourishing cities reduced to a few hundred inhabitants and the surrounding
countryside rendered a wasteland, the outcome of more than two decades of
war. In K’ai-feng, where six hundred to seven hundred local militia were on
hand to greet the Sung army, surviving inhabitants numbered only a thousand
households. Sword and lance were not the sole causes of the depopulation. A
year earlier, Mongol invaders had breached several dikes on the Yellow River,
inundating K’ai-feng and flooding lands as far south as Shou-chou, near the
Sung border.41 Communities in the north, a fraction of their former size, could
scarcely feed themselves, leaving Ch’u¨an Tzu-ts’ai with no local supplies of
food to requisition. After a two-week, two-hundred-fifty-mile-trek, his forces
urgently awaited provisions from the south. Chao K’uei soon arrived with
a reported fifty thousand additional men. The original plan had envisioned
combining the two armies, adding available conscripts in the north, and then
proceeding to Lo-yang. With provisions so scarce, troops were disinclined to
move on. Roughly one-fourth did, but hunger-induced exhaustion rendered
them useless. In the interim, a smaller Sung force had already taken Lo-yang,
birthplace of the Sung founder. Here as well, most of the population was
either dead or scattered when reinforcements arrived from the east. Lo-yang
had expected provisions from K’ai-feng and when the only arrivals were hungry
soldiers the men started eating their horses. Worse yet, by one account, Mongol
armies had learned of Sung designs well in advance and had laid a lethal trap.
They lured southern troops into seemingly undefended northern cities and
launched surprise strikes from the suburbs.42 The rout was decisive and Sung
armies retreating from Lo-yang lost eighty to ninety percent of their men
to injury or death. Forces at K’ai-feng withdrew at virtually the same time,
aborting the month-long campaign.
Returning south, Ch’u¨an Tzu-ts’ai blamed Shih Sung-chih for the reversal.
As commissioner in chief for the central border region, Shih had allegedly
withheld supplies in order to undermine intentionally an operation he opposed.
Regardless of the merit of the allegation, the delay in provisioning Sung armies
was not the decisive factor in their defeat. As Chao Fan later admitted, the
heavy losses related also to the confusion accompanying the retreat, with Sung
troops exhibiting poor discipline. Even more critical, it would seem, was the
glaring lack of planning by the campaign’s proponents. Earlier visitors to
the north had reported, often in grim detail, the widespread devastation and
41 Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1983) 5, p. 78. The Sung dynastic history (Sung shih), compiled in 1345 under
Mongol auspices, attributes flooding to the natural collapse of dikes along the Pien River; see SS 417,
p. 12502.
42 Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, p. 92.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.013
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 21:48:56, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
the reign of li-tsung 863
starvation in the region. With this intelligence, dispatching a force of sixty
thousand men on a major campaign with no more than two week’s provisions
was wildly irresponsible. It was naive, moreover, to expect them to prevail
without encountering significant resistance, either from the Mongols or their
surrogates. The small contingent initially sent to Lo-yang – fewer than ten
thousand men – suggests precisely this naive assumption. With most of the
men and supplies for the Lo-yang campaign expected to come from K’ai-feng,
progress in one area was entirely dependent upon success in another. There is no
mention of contingency plans. Owing to poor planning, the Sung leadership
dispatched too few soldiers to Lo-yang, where the enemy was strong, and too
many to K’ai-feng, where it was weak. Curiously, even with the advantage
of numbers of troops at both cities, the Sung still suffered defeat. The hasty
retreat suggests that the Sung armies were unenthusiastic about the venture,
which mirrored divisions within the command. The campaign, over by late
summer in 1234, reflected poorly upon leadership in Lin-an.
Protracted confrontation
Up to one hundred thousand soldiers and civilians, according to the Sung dynas-
tic history, were lost in the occupation effort during the summer of 1234.43 This
is an unlikely number for so limited a venture, but the war that was triggered
by this campaign lasted nearly forty-five years and claimed innumerable lives.
The Mongol leadership was initially slow in responding to the Sung invasion,
although it knew of Sung intentions well in advance.44 O¨go¨dei, then conven-
ing with commanders in the Altai Mountains, over nine hundred miles away,
had matters beyond the Sung to deliberate. Not until year’s end did he dispatch
Wang Chi, the envoy who had negotiated the 1233 alliance, to reprimand the
Sung. In turn, the Sung court sent several envoys of its own, which signaled a
desire to avoid a dangerous confrontation. The court’s entreaties fell upon deaf
ears, for Sung transgressions did not go unpunished. With O¨go¨dei personally
committed to conquest of the regions of what was to become eastern Russia,
he entrusted the punitive expedition against the Sung to his sons Ko¨ten and
Ko¨chu¨.45
Relative to earlier assaults on Koryo˘ (Korea) in 1231 and the current cam-
paign pushing eastward past the Volga River, the operation against the Sung
43 SS 407, p. 12281.
44 SS 412, p. 12374; Luc Kwanten, Imperial nomads: A history of Central Asia, 500–1500 (Philadelphia,
1979), p. 133.
45 For a discussion of this campaign, see Thomas T. Allsen, “The rise of the Mongolian empire and
Mongolian rule in north China,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border
states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994), pp. 368–72.
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seemed to have received low priority. But in the summer of 1235, Mongol
armies struck with a force that suggested otherwise. Focusing on central Sung
territory, they first expelled occupying forces commanded by Ch’u¨an Tzu-ts’ai
from T’ang-chou, territory seized by the Sung a year earlier. Crossing the Sung
border, they then raided Tsao-yang and Ying-chou3 in late autumn. When
they chose to withdraw, the Mongols carted off all that their horse transport
could carry. Ko¨chu¨ supervised activity in the east and the center of Sung ter-
ritory, while Ko¨ten moved against Szechwan with an assault on Mien-chou,
in the center of Li-chou circuit. With only a small defense force, and relying
on the natural barrier of mountains for protection, the unwalled prefecture
fell quickly. Ts’ao Yu-wen (chin-shih 1226) directed a spirited sortie launched
from T’ien-shui and succeeded in expelling the invaders. The Mongols, con-
tent at this point with harassing the Sung and pillaging when circumstances
permitted, likely did not consider their retreat a defeat.
The Mongols returned to menace the Sung the next spring, in 1236.46
Ko¨chu¨, now with reinforcements, lashed out at Sui-chou2, and Ying-chou3,
both in Ching-hsi circuit. Crossing the Han River, he advanced against Ching-
men commandery, nearly one hundred and twenty miles into the Sung in-
terior. This attack coincided with the eruption of a mutiny at Hsiang-yang,
creating chaotic conditions in this strategically vital prefecture before a suc-
cessful suppression. The Mongols resumed hostilities along the central Sung
border in late summer, but this was overshadowed by developments in the west.
Commanding a half million men – Mongol, Tangut, Jurchen, and Uighur –
Ko¨ten initiated a formidable offensive against Ta-an commandery, south of
Mien-chou and deep in Szechwan. These numbers were certainly exagger-
ated, but the force was still large enough to overwhelm Sung armies. Within
weeks Ta-an capitulated. The Sung commander, Ts’ao Yu-wen, and his brother
perished in Ta-an’s defense. The Mongol forces subsequently moved against
Chieh-chou and Wen-chou2 on the western fringes of Li-chou circuit. Sung
troops and subjects died by the tens of thousands. Even Ch’eng-tu, some
three hundred miles south of the border, temporarily fell into hostile hands. In
November at this critical moment in the campaign fate intervened. Ko¨chu¨, the
designated heir to O¨go¨dei, died suddenly, which prompted Ko¨ten to withdraw
in the west.
The southern offensive continued during the close of 1236 without Ko¨ten.
Focus now shifted to the central Huai region, placing the Mongols closer to
the Sung empire’s political center. Interruption of hostilities out west and
reassignment of troops from that theater to reinforce their armies in the Huai
46 HTC (1958) 168, pp. 4585–94; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 301–20.
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region may explain the Mongols’ initial success against the Sung in the two
Huai-nan circuits. At the battle of Chen-chou2, Mongol combatants report-
edly outnumbered Sung troops ten to one and in the end claimed a hundred
thousand Chinese lives, military and civilian.47 However, a sound strategy of
defense by Shih Sung-chih, Meng Kung, and Ch’iu Yu¨eh enabled the Sung to
recoup most of its territorial losses, including a devastated Chen-chou2.48 After
the fighting subsided and the Mongol forces left, only Hsiang-yang remained
in hostile hands. A half year later, in the autumn of 1237, the Mongols reap-
plied pressure against the central Huai region, harassing Kuang-chou2 and
Shou-ch’un. For a while, they even seized Fu-chou3, some one hundred and
twenty miles into Sung territory. The loss of Fu-chou3 seriously threatened
Chiang-ling, the capital of the Ching-hu North circuit. The Sung successfully
counterattacked, with Meng Kung again contributing the most to pushing
the northern intruders out of the region.
By early 1238, the Mongols had withdrawn from much of Sung territory,
and they approached the Sung court about a truce. The annual tribute of silver
and silk that they demanded was no more than what had been given to Chin,
and seemed acceptable under the circumstances.49 The Mongols had exposed a
weakness in the Sung’s ability to defend its borders, but they had also learned
a lesson about Sung tenacity. Sung territory was easier to seize than to retain
because the Sung had been able to regroup after each setback. In a larger
context, the Mongol empire was also in the midst of an intense struggle in
the region of eastern Russia, having recently taken Moscow and Vladimir, and
this may have made material goods momentarily more valuable to the needs
of their campaigns than additional territory. Unfortunately for both sides,
no agreement was reached. In response to Mongol overtures, the Sung court
dispatched a mission of its own. They apparently refused peace payments but
sought to improve relations. Official opinion on the Sung side left negotiators
with little latitude. A high-level executive at the Bureau of Military Affairs
and future chief councilor, Li Tsung-mien, opposed even modest concessions.
Beyond the issue of implicit humiliation, he feared that an initially small
sum might well grow, to become an enormous burden. Commander Meng
Kung similarly rejected peace proposals, as did Chief Councilor Ts’ui Yu¨-chih
(1158–1239). For the latter, an abrupt change in policy might undermine
the morale of border troops, which would leave the Sung vulnerable should
fighting resume.50 Others questioned whether Mongols could be trusted when
47 Hu, “Lu¨eh-lun Nan Sung mo-nien,” p. 378.
48 HTC (1958) 168, p. 4596.
49 HTC (1958) 169, p. 4611.
50 On these views, see SS 405, p. 12237; 406, p. 12263; 412, p. 12374; HTC (1958) 169, p. 4611.
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their deeds suggested a brutal indifference to their own promises. The court’s
chief advisor for the Huai region, Shih Sung-chih, is portrayed in primary
sources as the only prominent proponent of negotiated settlement. He did not
prevail.
In the summer of 1238, Sung forces recovered some lost territory, most
crucially Hsiang-yang, where a defection in the Mongol camp played into
Sung hands. Late 1238 and early 1239 brought two major confrontations. The
first was a large Mongol offensive against Lu-chou2, in the east. The second was
an assault in the west on K’uei-chou.51 In both instances, the invading forces
consisted of some eight hundred thousand men. Even a large fraction of that
number would have overwhelmingly outnumbered defenders at Lu-chou2, a
city of less than a half million residents. Defenses must have been strong, for the
enemy voluntarily withdrew. Mongol incursions into the K’uei-chou region
proved equally fruitless. Indeed, the significance of the maneuvers of 1238–9
lies not so much in the territory gained as in the arms invested. The Mongols,
clearly offended by Sung resistance to their peace offer, deployed vast numbers
of men to attack the Sung. Some of these men were no doubt deflected from the
campaign in Koryo˘, where the Mongol conquest was winding down; others
represented recent Chinese and Central Asian conscripts, for the Mongols
enforced mandatory military service and every household in its territories had
to surrender at least one male. Their ability to conscript manpower from a
seemingly inexhaustible pool made the Mongols more formidable than any
alien menace before them.
For the Sung, the only source of additional troops was North China’s refugee
population. This left southern armies at a numerical disadvantage.52 Even more
alarming was the Mongols’ adaptability. Early campaigns against the Chin had
been largely confined to cooler months, for the winter-hardened Mongols did
not perform well in the heat of summer. By the 1230s, partly because of
their now more ethnically diverse armies, their movements became far less
predictable. A brief assault in mid-1239 on Ch’ung-ch’ing, a city infamous
for its dreadfully humid summers, must have caught Sung defenders off guard
as the historic pattern for Mongol armies was to retreat northward at the
peak of summer. In the face of the enemy’s growing strength and adaptability,
continued Sung success at repulsing Mongol attacks suggests that Sung forces,
regarded even at home as no match for the Mongols, were not so weak after
all. Moreover, maintaining their superior command of rivers and tributaries
to the east, the Sung were able to move troops and provisions with relative
speed along efficient lines of communication. Mongols would require decades
51 Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 345–54, 363–70.
52 Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 363–5, 368–70.
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to make this additional adaptation. Finally, to avoid suicidal confrontations,
the Sung commonly took recourse to tactical retreat and regrouping, thereby
saving precious lives. Unfortunately, because of unrelenting enemy pressure
the Sung court was never able to seize the military initiative, and this left it
reacting to intrusions rather than initiating counterattacks.
Despite their campaigns against the Sung, the Mongols did not abandon
peace negotiations. Envoy Wang Chi conducted five missions on their behalf
between 1233 and his death in 1240.53 Even as late as 1241, the Mongols did
not appear committed to conquest of the south. The assaults against Ch’eng-
tu and Han-chou, toward the close of 1241, did not end in the acquisition
of territory or great wealth. When Han-chou fell after prolonged siege, the
attackers carried out a general massacre and then unexpectedly withdrew. With
this awesome show of force, the Mongols accomplished little militarily, save
for humiliating the Sung. At the outset of 1242, months after the death of
O¨go¨dei and the Szechwan offensive, the Mongols dispatched a large delegation
of seventy for Lin-an to reopen talks. Approaching from the west, the chief
envoy, and perhaps the entire delegation, was jailed at Ch’ang-sha by a Sung
regional commander, ostensibly angered by the envoy’s arrogance. The Sung
court apparently offered no formal apology for the incident, and the envoys
advanced no farther. Nothing developed from the northern initiative. The
extent of Sung intransigence is difficult to understand. The chief councilor
at the time, Shih Sung-chih, held Li-tsung’s complete confidence and acted,
infamously so, as the most articulate spokesperson for peaceful coexistence
between the Sung and the Mongols. A possible explanation is intransigence at
the Sung court. Sung leadership may have misread the struggle over the Mon-
gol succession following O¨go¨dei’s death, which was so intense as to threaten a
deadly civil war. Instability in the Mongol leadership contrasted sharply with
Sung accomplishments in the south, where the two-year lull in fighting had
enabled the Sung to replenish their armies and recover a good measure of lost
territory. Some credit for this southern rally belongs to Shih Sung-chih, but it
may have left him overconfident.
For the next ten years, fighting continued sporadically.54 In the west, the
Mongols raided cities deep inside Szechwan: Sui-ning (1242), Tzu-chou2
(1243), and Shu-chou (1242), all in T’ung-ch’uan circuit. Along the cen-
tral Sung border, the Mongols raided targets in Huai-nan West in 1244 and
again in 1246. For the first time it appears, the Mongols struck against targets
53 Ch’en Kao-hua, “Wang Chi shih Sung shih-shih k’ao-lu¨eh,” in Ryu¯ Shiken hakuse sho¯ju kinen: So¯-shi kenkyu¯
ronshu¯, ed. Kinugawa Tsuyoshi (Kyoto, 1989), pp. 103–11; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih,
pp. 119–21, 142–5.
54 On these, see Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 406–502; Li, Yu¨an-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 183–219.
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along the eastern Sung border, for example, T’ung-chou2 in 1242, a city
located near the mouth of the Yangtze River and within easy reach by sea
of the Sung capital. Still, peace more than conflict characterized the decade,
as the Mongol leadership was plagued by persistent squabbling. O¨go¨dei had
died in 1241, but opposition to the accession of his infant grandson, the heir
apparent, delayed for five years the crowning of Gu¨yu¨k (r. 1246–8), O¨go¨dei’s
younger son. Almost immediately Gu¨yu¨k found himself at war with the polit-
ically ambitious Batu, a descendant of Chinggis khan. In 1248, Gu¨yu¨k died
in the vicinity of Samarkand, in his war against Batu. This gave the Mongols
another succession to fight over, a contest requiring three years to resolve. In
the interim, North China suffered a severe drought that destroyed vegetation
and depleted the horse and cattle population by ninety percent. Nor were the
people spared, leaving Mongol forces short on men no less than horses. For the
decade following O¨go¨dei’s death, little diplomatic contact is recorded, save
for half-hearted overtures in 1247, when both sides spurned envoys owing to
mutual distrust.55
Having ruled out peaceful coexistence, the Sung government took advan-
tage of this respite to strengthen its military defenses, especially in the west,
where years of war had taken a heavy toll. A major shift of military commands
came in 1242, when the Sung court transferred its prized general, Meng Kung,
from the central border region to Szechwan, to become military commissioner
in chief and prefect of K’uei-chou2. Joining Meng Kung as Szechwan com-
missioner was the former overlord of Huai-nan East, Yu¨ Chieh (d. 1253), who
served concurrently as prefect of Ch’ung-ch’ing. The Sung also managed in
some places to strengthen border fortifications by organizing informal regional
militia. At the same time, the relative tranquility of the decade allowed the
disbanding of some border militia that were perceived as a threat to local
order.56 The number of government regulars declined as well. In better times,
Szechwan had been defended by up to eighty thousand men. This number fell
to less than fifty thousand by the 1240s.57 The quality of military leadership
in Szechwan may have been enhanced, but the quantity of material resources
invested by the Sung court was minimal. Commissioner Yu¨ Chieh, for all the
court’s goodwill, had to rely largely on local capital and initiative to strengthen
defenses, and Szechwan was abjectly short of both. In effect, Li-tsung recog-
nized the strategic importance of the west, but undermined its security by his
excessive parsimony in the allocation of the empire’s wealth.
The Sung did not enjoy the respite from Mongol attacks for long. By 1251,
the Mongols had a new ruler, Mo¨ngke (r. 1251–9), a shrewd and disciplined
55 Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 166–7, 182–3, 193–4.
56 HTC (1958) 173, p. 4725.
57 SS 411, p. 12357.
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man now resolved to conquer the Sung. He entrusted supervision of the China
theater to his younger brother Khubilai. Mo¨ngke devoted his own energies to
the invasion of Persia. The earlier raids of the 1230s and 1240s may have sought
to weaken and demoralize the Sung, but after 1253, Mongol objectives in East
Asia became focused on long-term conquest.58 Khubilai first eliminated the
Ta-li empire, in modern Yunnan, and within three years he had reduced all of
the autonomous groups of the distant southwest to vassal status. He initially
launched no major campaign against the Sung heartland, and border flare-ups
remained minor. Instead, the agenda of the early 1250s entailed a calculated
encirclement of the southern Sung empire by developing the southwest, a
region long neglected by the Sung, as a base of operations. The same maneuver
used to destroy the Chin was being used for the Sung: secure neighboring lands
to the north and south in preparation for the lethal squeeze from all sides. The
battle plan was not lost on the Sung court, which transferred a reputed one
hundred thousand troops from the northeast to Szechwan in early 1257. These
reinforcements had scarcely arrived when the Mongols, in full force, lunged
into the area.
Ch’eng-tu, with a population of nearly one million and the cultural center of
Szechwan, fell to the Mongols in early 1258 after offering a spirited resistance.
A half-dozen nearby prefectures capitulated swiftly. Before long, the Mon-
gols’ forces held much of the Ch’eng-tu Plain, from which they moved north
into Li-chou and west into T’ung-ch’uan circuits. Complementing the west-
ern thrust were lesser raids on targets in eastern and central Sung territory,
providing just enough pressure to inhibit the Sung court from transferring
troops from the east to Szechwan. Mo¨ngke personally joined in the Szechwan
campaign toward the close of 1258. From Khara Khorum he moved directly
south with an army reported to be forty thousand strong. Skirting Li-chou,
the circuit closest to the Mongol border, he joined his men at Han-chou, cen-
tral Szechwan, where he helped consolidate existing holdings before moving
against Li-chou. Ya-chou and Lung-chou2 in the far southwest, along with
Li-chou and P’eng-chou in the heart of Szechwan, are but a few of about ten
prefectures to come under Mongol control, all within a month or two. The
Szechwan campaign proceeded with the ease that the Mongols confidently had
expected and that the Sung woefully had feared, that is, until the battle at Ho-
chou4.59
58 Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 208–17; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 583–703, 713–97;
Li, Yu¨an-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 192–3.
59 Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 217–33; Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 723–6; Wang I-
ch’eng, Wang Chien shih-chi k’ao (Hsin-ying, 1983); Yao Ts’ung-wu, “Sung Meng Tiao-yu¨-ch’eng chan-i
chung Hsiung-erh fu-jen chia shih chi Wang Li yu¨ Ho-chou huo-te pao-ch’u¨an k’ao,” in Sung-shih
yen-chiu chi: Ti erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1964), pp. 123–40.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.013
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 21:48:56, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
870 richard l. davis
In March 1259, Mo¨ngke laid siege to Ho-chou4 (modern Ho-ch’uan, in
central Szechwan), a city of roughly one hundred and fifty thousand in the
heart of the T’ung-ch’uan circuit. Defense of the city was led by Wang Chien2
(d. 1259), an individual whose resolve would not be shaken despite a siege
that went on for five months. Apart from a committed populace, Wang Chien2
was also assisted by nature. Heavy rains during the early months of the siege
seriously sapped the morale of Mongol besiegers housed in tents. At the same
time, an epidemic broke out among the Mongol ranks. Apparently, this dis-
ease claimed the life of Mo¨ngke, who died outside Ho-chou4 on 11 August.
Khubilai, disbanding his army, hastened to Khara Khorum for the upcoming
elective assembly khuriltai, which took place on 5 May 1260.60 The offensive
against the Sung was postponed indefinitely.
Again, the Sung was afforded a reprieve despite meager investment in
the southwest. The loss of two prized commanders, Meng Kung in 1246
and Yu¨ Chieh in 1253, had heightened the Sung sense of vulnerability, and
Sung morale was further weakened by intense court factionalism. Nonetheless,
the battle at Ho-chou4 vividly demonstrated the hardened resistance that
the Mongols could expect if they proceeded east toward the Sung capital.
The mountains and the Yangtze gorges in the west and the rivers in central
Sung territory presented formidable obstacles to the Mongols. Perhaps their
recognition of these obstacles explains why the Mongols dispatched, just prior
to the 1260 installation of Khubilai as khaghan, a new peace envoy, followed
soon by two more. The Sung court rebuffed all such initiatives, apparently
unconvinced of its adversary’s genuine intent.
Mongol demands probably included only the payment of annual tribute
in exchange for peace, yet in 1260 the Sung court seemed intentionally set
on provoking the Mongols when they imprisoned the northern envoy, Hao
Ching. It is not altogether clear why the Sung, keenly interested in peace
talks in the 1240s, became unresponsive by 1260. By some accounts, the Sung
court considered Hao Ching to be a spy. By others, the chief councilor, Chia
Ssu-tao, had personally ordered the envoy’s incarceration to conceal unseemly
promises that Chia had made to Hao Ching a year earlier when the threat of
Mongol invasion was imminent.61 Nevertheless, the arrest had signaled the
Sung’s unwillingness to placate the Mongols. At this point in the negotiations
it seemed as if the two powers were speaking at cross-purposes. The Sung
saw peace as the simple absence of belligerency. The Mongols saw peace as an
60 Morris Rossabi, “The reign of Khubilai khan,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien
regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994)
p. 423.
61 SS 474, p. 13782; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 157, pp. 3708–9; HTC (1958) 176, p. 4802.
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alliance between the two.62 The Sung court also may have hoped that conflicts
over succession would preoccupy the Mongols and buy the Sung more time.
This was not total fancy, for soon after his accession in 1260, Khubilai found
himself engaged in a three-year war for the throne against his younger brother
Arigh Bo¨ke.63 These events coincided with a rebellion in Shantung led by Li
T’an, adopted son of Li Ch’u¨an, whose defection to the Sung gravely threatened
Mongol authority in the northeast.64 Further, economic devastation in the
wartorn northeastern region brought on by locusts and drought must have
made the Mongol position there even more tenuous.
bureaucratic leadership and the forces of opinion
The besieged emperor
Li-tsung may well be the most unfathomable of the Southern Sung emperors.
The paucity of late Sung source material is part of the problem, but so is the
complexity of the man. Few emperors match his compassion and charity, as
evidenced by his unprecedented establishment of the Child Benevolence Ser-
vice (Tz’u-yu chu¨) to care for unwanted children in the capital and a medical
service (Yao chu¨) to distribute medicine to the needy.65 He was compassionate
and had an unalterable loyalty to trusted officials, regardless of political pres-
sures. More than once, Li-tsung was compelled to dismiss a trusted official, but
this did not affect imperial favor and such men were never made scapegoats to
exonerate the throne. Malicious campaigns against Shih Mi-yu¨an, for exam-
ple, did not prompt the emperor to placate influential critics by posthumously
humiliating him. Nor did Li-tsung respond to an ill-conceived, ultimately
disastrous, foreign policy by punishing its architect, Cheng Ch’ing-chih. Li-
tsung’s steadfastness distinguished him from Kao-tsung, whose posthumous
mistreatment of Ch’in Kuei displayed a reluctance to deal with court critics
and accept personal responsibility for the actions of surrogates.
Li-tsung was generally sensitive to the forces of opinion. When opposition
to a certain policy or bureaucratic leader threatened the political stability, he
tended to compromise rather than risk confrontation. Moreover, he could be
magnanimous in the face of censure, as revealed in his response to the acrimony
of one overly zealous remonstrator: “[The official’s] words are exceedingly
direct. How could I ever be angered by direct words?”66 Valuing candor over
62 Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 119–21, 166–7, 181–2, 193–4.
63 See Rossabi, “The reign of Khubilai khan,” p. 422.
64 Kwanten, Imperial nomads, pp. 146–7; Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 206, pp. 4591–6; Li, Yu¨an-shih hsin-chiang,
vol. 2, pp. 267–9.
65 SS 43, p. 840.
66 SS 421, p. 12593.
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obsequiousness, Li-tsung often advanced his most vocal critics to prominent
posts. Trusting the judgment of leading advisors, he refused to challenge
or overturn their policy decisions. Such tolerance and support distinguished
him from Hsiao-tsung, whose frequent rejection of ministerial advice left an
indelibly autocratic imprint on an otherwise estimable reign.
Li-tsung also managed the imperial household better than most Sung
emperors. His empress, Hsieh Ch’iao (1210–83), although attuned to the
politics of the day, maintained a low profile for the duration of her husband’s
reign. She was not Li-tsung’s first choice as empress nor his favored compan-
ion, but this emotional distance generated no perceptible tensions within the
royal family. She gave no public display of indignation at his intemperance,
sexual and otherwise. Domestic discipline is also evinced in the rearing of his
adopted son and eventual successor, Tu-tsung, from whom Li-tsung expected
serious attention toward his studies and submissiveness toward authority. Such
circumspection within the royal family offers a sharp contrast to the chaos of
the Kuang-tsung years.
Li-tsung had few scholarly pretenses, unlike Hsiao-tsung, yet he presents
an image of thoughtfulness, even wit, certainly not characteristic of his better-
regarded predecessor Hsiao-tsung. Li-tsung often responded, when he chose to
respond, with meticulous care and cogency to the remonstrance of officials. In
deliberation and articulation, he easily surpassed Ning-tsung, the “tranquil,”
whose unopinionated silence seemed almost depersonalized.
As emperor, Li-tsung combined his native intelligence with the two Con-
fucian ideals of compassion for the ordinary people and respect for scholar-
officials. Never was he so smug as to tire of improving himself, nor so vain
as to deny his personal shortcomings. A man of immense potential, Li-tsung
might have ushered in a golden age for the southern empire. He did not, and
the fault was not entirely his.
From the outset of his reign in 1224, the nineteen-year-old emperor faced
the perennial threat of war. The conflict with Chin he inherited, but he trig-
gered the Mongol war. He was censured by later writers for starting a war
that his empire stood no chance of winning. The assessment seems unduly
harsh. Mongol and Sung armies had clashed long before 1234. Had the Sung
remained a submissive ally, it would have been only a matter of time before the
Mongols turned a covetous eye toward it. Recognizing this threat, the advo-
cates of war at the Sung court sought to seize the initiative by acting before the
Mongols could consolidate power and mobilize resources in the north. Once
unleashed, war imposed an immense strain on already overextended military
and economic systems. Li-tsung and his ministers never developed a satisfac-
tory means of financing the protracted conflict, nor did they ever develop a
coherent long-term strategy to win it. But the reproach of later historians does
not rest exclusively on Li-tsung’s failures in foreign policy.
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Li-tsung also had to engage with the political forces of prominent intellec-
tual movements. Li-tsung was the first emperor to endorse parts of the tenets
of the Tao-hsu¨eh movement articulated by Chu Hsi. Li-tsung also was not one
to slight traditional rituals. Within two months of assuming the throne, he
performed the elaborate Ming-t’ang (Hall of Brilliance) rituals, and continued
this tradition once every three years for nearly the duration of his reign. He
may have inherited this habit from his predecessor, for Ning-tsung was even
more meticulous about performing this and other sacrifices. Recurring natural
disasters and the traditional assumption that these reflected the dissatisfaction
of Heaven may also explain Li-tsung’s special concern with mollifying the
spirits. The high cost of new temples to imperial ancestors and the elaborate
feasts accompanying ritual sacrifices irritated many critics, with some conclud-
ing that the sacrifices served merely as pretexts for merriment. “In praying to
Heaven one employs sincerity, not excess,” warned one official, who viewed
imperial extravagance as inappropriate at a time of national adversity.67 But
historians’ reproof of Li-tsung does not rest upon his excessive dedication to
ritual, either.
The emperor’s one shortcoming that most irritated contemporary and later
observers was the immodesty of his amorous indulgences.68 Some blame Shih
Mi-yu¨an, insisting that he had intentionally “poisoned” the emperor’s mind
through an abundance of female companions intended to preoccupy him within
the palace. The placing of responsibility with Shih Mi-yu¨an is questionable,
but Li-tsung’s inclination toward sexual intemperance appears undeniable, and
it persisted for the duration of his reign. Consort Chia (d. 1247), daughter of
Commissioner Chia She, became imperial consort in 1232 after winning the
emperor’s affections. Li-tsung so doted on her that one disapproving official
compared this to the infamous affair of Emperor T’ang Hsu¨an-tsung and Yang
Kuei-fei, a romance that nearly toppled the T’ang dynasty in the 750s. After
Chia’s death, Li-tsung took to another consort, ne´e Yen (d. 1260). Neither
woman cared much for politics, and so official concern would have been mod-
erate had the emperor confined his energies to such liaisons with his recognized
consorts. He did not. In his middle years, he took to entertaining Taoist nuns
in his palace. Their comings and goings were repeatedly criticized in offi-
cial memorials and sparked unending innuendo and scandal. Li-tsung drew
even more criticism in 1255, by summoning common street prostitutes to the
palace for his new year’s entertainment. Officials were quick to condemn such
67 SS 44, p. 852; 405, p. 12247; 411, p. 12358; 418, p. 12521; 438, p. 12985.
68 On Li-tsung’s personal life, see SS 44, p. 854; 243, pp. 8658–60; 407, pp. 12279–89; 418, p. 12515;
421, pp. 12586, 12588; 438, p. 12985; 474, p. 13780; Ting Ch’uan-ching, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien
(1935; Taipei, 1982) 18, p. 915.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.013
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 21:48:56, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
the reign of li-tsung 875
conduct but were generally not interested in understanding the factors con-
tributing to it.
Contemporaries portrayed Li-tsung, prior to his accession, as mild-
mannered, serious, and stable, with greater promise than the irascible Chao
Hung. His youth was spent in a secluded area of Shao-hsing. He moved to the
capital, Lin-an, only two years before becoming emperor. He never received
the extensive training and political exposure commonly afforded candidates
for the throne. Then, literally overnight, he became imperial son and emperor,
all arranged by the chief councilor, Shih Mi-yu¨an, and Dowager Empress Wu.
Becoming emperor seems to have changed him. Although never hopelessly
indolent like most stereotypical last rulers in the Chinese historiographic
tradition, Li-tsung was criticized early on for holding court irregularly. His
withdrawal, and his cynicism about the conduct of government, grew more
acute with time. During Li-tsung’s first eight years in power, Shih Mi-yu¨an was
on hand to advise the youth on political matters and Dowager Empress Yang2
to supervise his personal life. By their mere presence, these two discouraged
the emperor from asserting himself, rendering him deferentially detached. Li-
tsung never overcame this detachment, even after the deaths of the empress in
1232 and Shih in 1233 and the “era of change” (keng-hua) that he proclaimed in
their wake. Imperial indifference, it would seem, related also to pressures from
the bureaucracy. The question of the posthumous status of Chao Hung, for
example, appeared and reappeared in official memorials for decades. Officials
seemed indifferent to Li-tsung’s insecurity as an upstart and to the possibility
that their persistent criticisms might drive the emperor from the court at a
time when the empire most needed a strong, unified leadership.
The sway of Ming-chou favorites
Although Ch’in Kuei and Han T’o-chou each held power for a significant period
of time and were able to cow the civil service into submission, eventually
their unpopularity overwhelmed them and their deaths brought retaliation
from opposition groups. Loss of posthumous honors, persecution of kin, and
confiscation of family property were their long-term reward. Shih Mi-yu¨an,
while considerably more powerful and controversial than either Ch’in Kuei or
Han T’o-chou, did not suffer similar humiliation. The emperor was steadfast
in his favor. Two decades after Shih Mi-yu¨an’s death, Li-tsung composed a
tomb inscription in his memory. Those opposed to Shih’s policies tirelessly
attempted to undermine that favor, but failed. Nor could they uproot the dead
councilor’s influence, a result related in part to the emperor’s character but also
to the shrewd political maneuvering of Shih Mi-yu¨an himself. Not content
merely with his own personal entrenchment, Shih Mi-yu¨an had built up a
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younger generation of talent and had helped place them in key bureaucratic
posts. His associates held impeccable scholarly credentials and occasionally
voiced critical opinions of him. They were not mere lackeys. Some, like Shih
Mi-yu¨an himself, came from Ming-chou (modern Ning-po, also referred to
as Ch’ing-yu¨an in some Sung texts), but not all. Their appointments did
not rest exclusively on provincial ties. Interestingly, none was Shih’s relative,
despite the proliferation of credentialed officials among his kin. Shih Mi-yu¨an
cultivated patronage, not nepotism. His prote´ge´s were well qualified and well
connected, and their continued presence at court long after his death helped
moderate any political backlash toward Shih and his policies.
The most notable of these prote´ge´s was Cheng Ch’ing-chih.69 A Ming-chou
native who had studied at the Imperial University beginning in 1202, Cheng
later held various teaching posts in and away from the capital before returning
to the university as a professor. Cheng was appointed personal tutor to the
future Li-tsung nearly two years before Li-tsung’s accession, and Cheng Ch’ing-
chih may have assisted Shih Mi-yu¨an in arranging Chao Yu¨n’s controversial
installation as son and then successor. Named assistant councilor in 1230,
Cheng became chief councilor just days before Shih Mi-yu¨an’s death, a position
Cheng held for the next three years.
Cheng Ch’ing-chih owed much to Shih Mi-yu¨an’s patronage, yet his will-
ingness to speak out on the Li Ch’u¨an affair, urging the use of force, and
the subsequent success of the 1230 suppression contributed significantly to
his own independent political capital. Official acquiescence in Cheng Ch’ing-
chih’s rise to power relates also to his support for the Tao-hsu¨eh proponents,
Wei Liao-weng and Chen Te-hsiu. Restoration of rank and salary to the two,
occurring in Shih Mi-yu¨an’s last years, was attributed to Cheng’s influence.
As the new councilor in 1233, Cheng promoted these once-alienated intel-
lectuals to high-level metropolitan posts. Chen Te-hsiu was made an assistant
councilor and Wei Liao-weng an executive at the military bureau. Cheng
Ch’ing-chih also restored to office other one-time opponents of Shih Mi-yu¨an,
while removing some of the less esteemed partisans. Already holding the con-
fidence of the throne, Cheng apparently made such moves to generate good-
will outside the palace and thereby consolidate his influence within the civil
service.
The Cheng Ch’ing-chih years were characterized by reconciliation within
the bureaucracy. Apart from politically reviving the careers of many Tao-
hsu¨eh proponents, the court approved a modest elevation in the posthumous
status of Chao Hung, a continuing cause ce´le`bre for critics of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s
69 SS 414, pp. 12419–23; Richard W. Bodman and Charles A. Peterson, “Cheng Ch’ing-chih,” in Sung
biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 156–63.
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legacy. Another bid for support from Tao-hsu¨eh proponents came from Ch’iao
Hsing-chien, a close associate of Cheng serving as an executive at the Bureau
of Military Affairs. Ch’iao proposed offering state sacrifices at the imperial
Confucian temple to the five Tao-hsu¨eh masters (Chu Hsi, Chou Tun-i, Ch’eng
Hao, Ch’eng I, and Chang Tsai). A shrine to Chao Ju-yu¨, a popular figure
among contemporary thirteenth-century Tao-hsu¨eh proponents, was proposed
for the temple of Ning-tsung. For the first time, the ideas and instructions
of the Learning of the Way (Tao-hsu¨eh), officially persecuted less than four
decades earlier, were granted government approval, and became in stages the
cornerstone of the curriculum at the Imperial University and hence throughout
the empire. To the modern researcher, such changes in the ideological direction
of the bureaucracy may appear as scarcely more than window dressing, changes
in form, not substance. The test of innovation on the part of the administration
under Li-tsung was whether it could substantially alter the widely assailed
tradition and practices of one-man dominance that had been reinforced by the
twenty-five-year tenure of Shih Mi-yu¨an.
During Hsiao-tsung’s reign, the government had moved toward a two-
councilor system. The councilor of the right, although the junior position, was
where power rested. The position of councilor of the left tended to be reserved
for elder statesmen, who often lacked the vitality to actively engage in decision
making. However, after the death of Han T’o-chou in 1207, there was only one
councilor. Ning-tsung never bothered to name a second councilor, and Shih
Mi-yu¨an did not insist that another councilor serve with him. Within a week
of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s death in 1233, Wei Liao-weng requested restoration of the
dual councilorship and that bureaucratic authority be divided in such a way
as to forestall the emergence of future autocrats.70 Li-tsung responded, albeit
a year and a half later, by naming Ch’iao Hsing-chien councilor of the right
and elevating Cheng Ch’ing-chih to be senior councilor. The move did not
imply Li-tsung’s confidence in such a division of power, however. No sooner had
Li-tsung appointed Ch’iao Hsing-chien than he commented: “I employ Ch’ing-
chih quite exclusively, but owing to the many affairs of the realm being too
much for one councilor to manage, Hsing-chien is named assistant.”71 The dual
councilorship persisted for five years, yet there occurred no reorganization of
the metropolitan bureaucracy along the lines recommended by Wei Liao-weng
and others. Perhaps sweeping institutional change appeared too dangerous in
a time of war; but even an extended peace might not have changed things. In
1236, when the prefect of Lin-an raised the issue of lengthy terms of office, a less
than subtle allusion to Shih Mi-yu¨an’s marathon tenure, Li-tsung responded:
70 SS 437, p. 12968; HTC (1958) 167, pp. 4550–1; Wei, Ho-shan hsien-sheng ta ch’u¨an-chi 19, pp. 1a–18a.
71 HTC (1958) 168, p. 4577.
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“In utilizing men, it is unnecessary to change them frequently.”72 Maintaining
a high turnover, especially in the bureaucracy’s upper echelons, was precisely
the method employed by Hsiao-tsung to prevent his executives from becoming
too powerful. Li-tsung took an antithetical approach to governing. He was
never convinced that domination by one man was destabilizing, that lifelong
tenures were politically unsound, or that powerful ministers were a threat to
the imperial sway. To him, good government rested upon employing the right
men, not a complex array of institutional controls.
The tenure of Cheng Ch’ing-chih lasted three years and ended in autumn
1236, but not because the emperor sought to infuse new blood into the bureau-
cracy. Nor was imperial confidence shaken by charges of grossly unethical con-
duct, including charges that Cheng had accepted bribes and allowed his status
to be exploited by his son for their personal profit.73 The most vocal critic of
Cheng Ch’ing-chih was Tu Fan, an eloquent Tao-hsu¨eh proponent then serv-
ing as attending censor. Although the Tao-hsu¨eh intellectuals had won initial
appointment to such high metropolitan posts through the councilor’s patron-
age, they were the first to criticize him. When the Mongols launched their
massive assault on Hsiang-yang in 1236, Cheng Ch’ing-chih almost by neces-
sity submitted his resignation, which was often intended as a ceremonious
gesture; the emperor unceremoniously accepted it.
The departure of Cheng Ch’ing-chih, however, had a negligible effect on
court policy. Ch’iao Hsing-chien replaced him as councilor of the left, and Ts’ui
Yu¨-chih was appointed councilor of the right. Both men supported the previous
administration’s rapprochement with the Tao-hsu¨eh proponents, even though
they had no close personal links to those involved in the movement. Both men
embraced a conciliatory policy toward Mongol aggression in the aftermath
of the Sung’s failed attempt to recapture K’ai-feng two years earlier in the
summer of 1234. They preferred peace while preparing for war. According
to Ts’ui Yu¨-chih, peace was feasible only “if in negotiating a peace, we can
also have security.”74 The new councilors shared with Cheng Ch’ing-chih the
experience of serving under Shih Mi-yu¨an during his last turbulent decade.
All three were on cordial terms, despite differences on the specifics of foreign
policy, and they followed, in some measure, Shih’s tactic of moderation. At
least in domestic policies, the late 1230s were years of continuity.
Such continuity helps explain the rise of yet another Shih kinsman from
Ming-chou to prominence in the capital. Shih Mi-yu¨an hailed from an
72 HTC (1958) 168, p. 4587.
73 On these charges, see SS 407, p. 12282; 409, p. 12333; 415, p. 12458; 424, pp. 12659–60; 437,
p. 12964; 438, p. 12987; HTC (1958) 168, p. 4595; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 53, p. 7a.
74 SS 406, p. 12263.
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exceedingly accomplished kin group, with some sixty nephews and cousins
holding civil service rank in the thirteenth century. He probably did not know
most of them well, having spent the bulk of his adult years in Lin-an, but
his influence affected the careers of some. Shih Sung-chih, for example, a col-
lateral nephew who received his chin-shih degree in 1220, won appointment
to a number of influential military-related posts through his uncle’s inter-
vention.75 He earned recognition as an innovative administrator in his own
right. By streamlining and making self-sufficient the military organizations
in strategically vital Hsiang-yang and Tsao-yang, for example, Shih Sung-chih
helped prepare these two prefectures for the deadly conflict ahead. Later, he
served as prefect of Hsiang-yang and military commissioner in chief for the
Ching-hsi and Ching-hu circuits of central Sung territory, which made him the
most influential military figure in the empire. Shih Sung-chih also supervised
the talks that culminated in the anti-Chin alliance with the Mongols of 1233.
He commanded the offensive against T’ang-chou, directed the final assault
against Ts’ai-chou, and forwarded to Lin-an the Chin imperial paraphernalia
that he retrieved from the defeated Chin emperor.76 A grateful court rewarded
him with appointment as minister of war.
Shih Sung-chih had vehemently opposed Cheng Ch’ing-chih’s ill-fated mil-
itary offensive to retake K’ai-feng. He had denounced the 1234 action much
as Shih Mi-yu¨an had denounced the initiatives of Han T’o-chou. By then
commissioner for the central Huai River region and with fifteen years of
military experience there, Shih Sung-chih noted that recent floods and crop
failures had left the region too impoverished to support an offensive. “Peo-
ple with no home to return to will join together as bandits; soldiers suffer-
ing from hunger and starvation will be defeated even before combat.”77 His
warnings, however prophetic, were ignored. The outcome of the campaign
in the north was that with their provisions exhausted, Sung troops returned
south having accomplished nothing, save inciting the Mongols. Revanchists
charged Shih Sung-chih with intentionally withholding provisions to ensure
the Sung defeat. Shih Sung-chih may have boycotted the effort in the north
for fear of endangering his own troops or simply in response to pressures
from other commanders, Chao Yen-na for example, who also boycotted the
campaign.78 Such acts of insubordination were not isolated, but the censure
of Shih Sung-chih was the most strident. He responded by surrendering his
war ministership, a largely nominal post in Sung times.
75 On his career, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 142–57.
76 Li, Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 162–6.
77 SS 414, p. 12424.
78 SS 413, p. 12400.
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In the mid-1230s, Shih Sung-chih continued to receive high-level regional
appointments, a clear sign of imperial favor, despite perceptible tensions
between him and Cheng Ch’ing-chih. Although he never resided in Lin-an, his
input on border policy was assured through memorials on various topics, from
troop morale to fiscal management. Shih Sung-chih’s credibility was further
enhanced by his success in routing major Mongol assaults on Kuang-chou2
and Huang-chou in 1237, which led to a reduction in fighting and new peace
overtures from the north. A grateful court responded by naming him assistant
councilor in 1238 and, a year later, chief councilor of the right. This made him
the third chief councilor to emanate from his Ming-chou clan, Shih Hao and
Shih Mi-yu¨an having preceded him.
Shih Sung-chih initially shared power with Li Tsung-mien, councilor of
the left, and Ch’iao Hsing-chien, distinguished military councilor (p’ing-chang
chu¨n-kuo chung-shih). It seemed an odd threesome. The new councilor was a
prominent proponent of peace, and his elevation to the high post, coinciding
with the arrival of a Mongol emissary, appeared to represent the emperor’s
official endorsement of propeace advocates and policies. Advancement of Yu¨
T’ien-hsi (chin-shih 1223), another Ming-chou native closely identified with
Shih Mi-yu¨an, to assistant councilor suggests the same. Yet Li Tsung-mien and
Ch’iao Hsing-chien shared none of Shih Sung-chih’s commitment to peace.
They opposed on principle all significant concessions. Perhaps this was still
a time of indecision for Li-tsung, or maybe he was unwilling to sacrifice an
older generation of trusted officials to accommodate the new. Whatever the
emperor’s motives, this contradictory set of appointments ensured no abrupt
change in policy. The deaths of both Li Tsung-mien and Ch’iao Hsing-chien
in early 1241, however, left Shih Sung-chih with undisputed authority at
court. For the next four years, he remained the only chief councilor, effectively
reviving, for better or worse, one-man dominance.
Shih Sung-chih was never popular among his colleagues. As early as 1234,
Investigating Censor Wang Sui2 (chin-shih 1202) accused him of imperiling
the empire to advance his personal reputation. Wang Yeh (chin-shih 1220), a
minor official at the Bureau of Military Affairs, charged that Shih’s propeace
sentiments undermined the empire’s defense effort. Attendant Censors Hsieh
Fang-shu (chin-shih 1223) and Wang Wan (chin-shih 1223) questioned Shih
Sung-chih’s overall competence and advised against his further advancement.79
The charges, made while Shih Sung-chih was assistant councilor, reveal not
just disesteem, but outright contempt. These feelings seem especially curious
for a man whose advice on border policy and conduct of the war proved, in the
79 On early criticisms, see SS 41, p. 801; 415, p. 12461; 416, pp. 12984–5; 417, p. 12510; 420,
p. 12575.
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long run, to be sound. Justified or not, critics continued their reproofs after
he became councilor. Countering them was not easy.
As chief councilor, Shih Sung-chih retained general command of the Huai,
Ching-hu, and Szechwan armies. It was a privilege enjoyed by few councilors
of the Southern Sung, not even the powerful Shih Mi-yu¨an. The prestige of the
dual appointments notwithstanding, the responsibilities were too much for
one man. Shih Sung-chih spent his first year as chief councilor monitoring the
volatile border in the west, and returned to Lin-an in the spring of 1240. In
his absence, the capital was hit with a famine so severe that ordinary citizens
disappeared in broad daylight as the marketplace traded daily in human flesh.
Never in Li-tsung’s long reign, before or after, did calamity hit so close to
home. Shih Sung-chih’s presence in Lin-an could hardly have forestalled natural
disaster or alleviated the human suffering, but his conspicuous absence implied
an indifference that antagonized many.
Subsequently, Shih Sung-chih spent more time in the capital. The border
situation had largely stabilized after 1241, but the empire’s domestic prob-
lems seemed as intractable as ever. Tu Fan twice memorialized the throne in
1240 about crises of unprecedented proportions.80 Natural disasters extended
from the lower Huai to Fu-chien, bringing with them and exacerbating soar-
ing prices, bandit outbreaks, alien invasions, empty granaries, and widespread
vagrancy. There was disorder in the heavens and turbulence on earth. Despite
these upheavals, Shih Sung-chih’s defensive achievements were numerous.
Beyond denying the Mongols a foothold in Sung territory, he presided over
the restoration of territory that had been regained. He also devised a highly
imaginative scheme of regional defense by providing refugees with land to till
with guaranteed low rents, while organizing them into militia reserve units for
use in times of emergency.81 Reminiscent of Wang An-shih’s pao-chia system,
its objective was to curtail military expenditures while strengthening regional
defense. However, Shih Sung-chih’s record contained no notable accomplish-
ments beyond military policy. He had not managed to reach a peace accord
with the Mongols, a failure that ensured prolonged instability and hardship
along the empire’s border. Nor had he developed a coherent economic policy
in the face of spiraling defense costs and declining revenues. Finally, he never
developed a close working relationship with the civil service as a whole, never
acquired the political adeptness needed to manipulate groups and individuals
who held differing views, and never built a solid base of support within the
bureaucracy. Focused on regional service, his career had not given him exposure
80 SS 407, pp. 12282–6; Tu Fan, Ch’ing-hsien chi [Ssu-k’u ch’u¨an-shu, Wen-yu¨an ko 1779 ed.] (Taipei, 1971)
9, pp. 2b–11a; Davis, Court and family in Sung of China, pp. 131–2.
81 SS 176, p. 4275.
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to the management of the metropolitan bureaucracy. Critics often referred to
him with contempt, as a “powerful councilor,” yet his career left him more
vulnerable within the government than other powerful men of Southern Sung.
Shih Sung-chih was rarely so rash or so secure as to dismiss or demote crit-
ics outright. In the case of Tu Fan, for example, he reportedly “gave an outer
expression of forbearance while detesting him inside.”82 Shih made no appar-
ent effort to block Tu Fan’s appointment to an executive post at the Bureau of
Military Affairs, where he also had a seat. The nomination may well have been
initiated by him in the hope of mollifying critics, a tactic in the tradition of
Shih Mi-yu¨an. Cooperation between Shih Sung-chih and Tu Fan nonetheless
proved impossible. Tu Fan, following his 1244 promotion to second spot in the
military bureaucracy, threatened to resign if Li Ming-fu (chin-shih 1209), an
assistant councilor with close ties to Shih Sung-chih, was not dismissed. Chal-
lenging one superior and insulting another, the demand betrayed a profound
arrogance. Students at the Imperial University, no doubt prompted by pro-
fessors sympathetic to Tu Fan, joined in attacking Li Ming-fu and ultimately
the chief councilor himself. Realizing that Tu Fan would accept nothing short
of his own resignation, Shih Sung-chih orchestrated the dismissals of both Tu
Fan and Li Ming-fu. The emperor, detesting the unseemliness of confrontation,
supported Shih’s decision. The dismissal of Tu Fan roused others to speak out,
including Huang Shih-yung (chin-shih 1226) and Liu Ying-ch’i, to name but
two. The dismissals also served to polarize much of the bureaucracy against
Shih Sung-chih, which set the stage for another conflict.
In the autumn of 1244, tensions between Shih Sung-chih and the promi-
nent forces of opinion finally exploded into political battle. The death of Shih’s
father led the opposition to believe that Shih Sung-chih would step down and
observe the traditional three years of mourning expected of a son. However,
Li-tsung intervened, waiving the customary mourning obligation and retain-
ing Shih in office. There were abundant precedents for the emperor’s action.
Ning-tsung had waived mourning for commanders Chao Fan and Chao K’uei
following the death of their father in 1222, and that of their mother in 1230.
The two waivers for the Chao brothers went virtually unnoticed. Shih Sung-
chih’s uncle had received a similar waiver in 1209, while Shih’s own unique
qualifications as civil and military leader offered similarly compelling rea-
sons to forego ritual and retain his services. The reaction by many officials to
this simple restoration directive was unusually strident. Memorials of protest
flooded the court, the most notable coming from the metropolitan student pop-
ulation. Signing petitions were 144 students at the Imperial University, 67 at
the Military Academy, 94 at the Lin-an Academy, and 34 at the Imperial Clan
82 SS 407, p. 12286.
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Academy (Tsung-hsu¨eh). The most widely publicized of these petitions came
from the Imperial University, where students refused to conceal their contempt
for Shih Sung-chih. They attacked him on moral grounds. By orchestrating
his own recall, they charged, he was being shamelessly unfilial. He was accused
of bribing his way to the councilorship and then exploiting the privileges of
the office for personal profit. Apart from issues of personal morality and polit-
ical ethics, students warned that three consecutive generations of councilors
from one family posed a grave threat to dynastic stability. “Since antiquity,
when high officials [from families] which, for as many as three generations,
monopolized imperial favor and exploited the power [vested in them], they
were inevitably [responsible for] the collapse of their empires. . . . Alas, the
Shih house has held onto power now for three generations!”83
The opposition’s large numbers and cogent arguments did not easily shake
the emperor’s resolve. Within a month of his father’s death, Shih Sung-chih
was ordered to hasten his return to Lin-an. He delayed, perhaps out of frustra-
tion, and this only strengthened the hand of the opposition. In the interim,
the throne summoned Tu Fan to the capital, ostensibly for consultation. The
emperor appointed Liu Han-pi (d. 1244), a vocal critic of Shih Sung-chih,
as censor, and named two other prominent men of Tao-hsu¨eh convictions, Li
Hsin-ch’uan (1167–1244) and Ch’en Hua (chin-shih 1205), to executive posts
in the bureaucracy.84 These moves are commonly interpreted as signs of the
emperor’s coming to his senses about his unworthy councilor, an interpretation
totally unjustified, for the councilor’s seat remained vacant. Li-tsung’s gesture,
it appears, had the limited objective of silencing the opposition without sacri-
ficing his favorite. However, Shih Sung-chih’s narrow political base continued
to erode and, after three months of relentless pressure, his resignation was
accepted by the emperor.
Shih’s resignation was not enough for his opponents; only a permanent
discrediting of Shih Sung-chih could guarantee no future revival. The throne
restored the dual councilorship. The senior position went to Fan Chung (chin-
shih 1208), a former chancellor at the Imperial University and a professor at
the Military Academy. This was certainly a concession to students. Succeeding
Shih Sung-chih as councilor of the right was Tu Fan, which was another victory
for Tao-hsu¨eh proponents. With a more favorable bureaucratic leadership, the
opponents of Shih pushed their assault. The summer of 1245 brought the
sudden death of Hsu¨ Yu¨an-chieh (chin-shih 1232), a one-time chancellor at
83 On the dismissal of Shih Sung-chih, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 150–4;
Wang Chien-ch’iu, “Sung-tai t’ai-hsu¨eh yu¨ t’ai-hsu¨eh-sheng” (M.A. thesis, Fu-jen Ta-hsu¨eh, 1965),
pp. 306–7.
84 SS 406, pp. 12275–7; 419, pp. 12560–4; 438, pp. 12984–6; HTC (1958) 171, pp. 4660–1.
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the university whose opposition to Shih Sung-chih was well known. Hsu¨ had
dined the night before he died with Fan Chung, a man close to Shih Sung-chih,
and many suspected foul play. Two other critics of Shih Sung-chih, the censor
Liu Han-pi and Shih’s own nephew Shih Ching-ch’ing, died under similarly
suspicious circumstances.85 Tu Fan had died earlier in 1245 of natural causes,
but the rash of deaths among prominent critics appeared more than coin-
cidental. Seventy-three students at the Imperial University, exercising their
new political might, seized on such rumors and demanded an open investiga-
tion. The emperor graciously granted the demand. He even offered an unusual
reward of one hundred thousand strings of cash for information pertaining
to the cases. No evidence was ever found to support the assassination theory
or to implicate Shih Sung-chih, but the damage to his reputation had been
done. When Li-tsung considered reappointing him in 1246, resistance from
Shih’s opponents forced the emperor’s retreat. Shih Sung-chih never returned
to public life.
The fall of Shih Sung-chih did not, however, end the dominance of Ming-
chou favorites. The former chief councilor, Cheng Ch’ing-chih, returned from
retirement in 1245 as palace lecturer. In the spring of 1247, Councilors Fan
Chung and Yu Ssu (chin-shih 1220) retired. The emperor promptly replaced
them with Cheng Ch’ing-chih. Cheng remained in power for the next four and
a half years, sharing it, albeit only briefly, with Commander Chao K’uei. The
potentially controversial decision to restore Cheng Ch’ing-chih, already in his
seventies, to power encountered surprisingly little resistance, which suggests
that Cheng enjoyed some measure of respect among court critics despite his
former failures. The late 1240s were generally tranquil years, the border and
the bureaucracy relatively free of conflict, except for the occasional opposition
to some of the councilor’s high-level appointments.
One of Cheng’s rising favorites was Shih Chai-chih (1205–49), the son of
Shih Mi-yu¨an. Shih Chai-chih appears to have been on especially good terms
with the emperor, the two being roughly the same age and frequently in one
another’s company. On the eve of his father’s death in 1233, Shih Chai-chih
had received honorary chin-shih status and a high-level sinecure. Having never
passed the examinations on his own, these extraordinary acts symbolized the
emperor’s enduring goodwill toward that branch of the Shih clan. As early as
1240, Li-tsung had sought to have Shih Chai-chih return to the capital. The
opportunity finally came in 1248, and Shih Chai-chih emerged as minister of
personnel and subsequently associate chief at the Bureau of Military Affairs.
Whether the promotion was initiated by the emperor or by his chief councilor,
85 On the incident, see SS 414, pp. 12426–7; 415, pp. 12454–9; 424, pp. 12660–2; HTC (1958) 171,
pp. 4656–9; Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, vol. 6 pieh-chi, pp. 18a–20a.
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Cheng Ch’ing-chih, we do not know. In the light of old debts to Shih Mi-yu¨an,
no doubt both men endorsed the move despite the younger Shih’s unpopularity
among court critics. With such support, Shih Chai-chih may well have risen
even higher, but he died prematurely the next year.
Another Ming-chou native advanced to high office under Cheng Ch’ing-
chih was Ying Yao (chin-shih 1223), a former professor at the Imperial Univer-
sity. His sound official record and good overall reputation may explain why his
advancement to assistant councilor in 1249 encountered no notable opposition,
despite overtones of regional favoritism. Not so readily accepted, however, was
the nomination of Pieh Chih-chieh (d. 1253) to assistant councilor in the sum-
mer of 1247. An individual closely identified with the administration of Shih
Sung-chih, Pieh was forced to resign within a year. Cheng Ts’ai (d. 1249),
named to an executive post at the Bureau of Military Affairs, encountered
similar opposition and for the same reason: he had been a partisan of Shih
Sung-chih. He was dismissed. Such selections suggest that Cheng Ch’ing-
chih, in choosing high-level subordinates, gave clear preference to Ming-chou
provincials or to individuals identified with the Shih Sung-chih administra-
tion. The opposition to Cheng’s appointments contrasts significantly with the
success of Shih Mi-yu¨an, who commonly employed fellow provincials, but did
so less blatantly and rarely made objectionable appointments. The resistance
encountered by Cheng Ch’ing-chih implies that the lengthy dominance of
Ming-chou scholars at court, having made too many enemies on all sides, was
nearing its end.
Cheng Ch’ing-chih’s greatest shortcoming was not regional favoritism, but
his indulgence of family members. His wife and son were notorious for their
political deal making and profiteering.86 Already seventy when recalled to
office, Cheng should have been provided by the emperor with a second coun-
cilor to assist in routine administration. The lack of a second man created a
vacuum. During his long tenure in power, Shih Mi-yu¨an had consciously nur-
tured a younger generation of talent capable of winning the emperor’s trust and
the bureaucracy’s respect. Cheng Ch’ing-chih did not do so, perhaps because
he had been out of power for a decade, or perhaps because he lacked foresight,
or perhaps because border problems and constant bickering with a vexatious
bureaucracy sapped too much of his energy. He left no well-placed prote´ge´s
to whom the throne could turn. As an older generation of statesmen died
off, the political vacuum became more serious. From 1248 to 1251, Cheng
Ch’ing-chih petitioned at least five times asking to retire, but each time his
request was denied. With few reliable associates, the aging councilor looked to
his family to assist him in routine matters. The combination of nepotism and
86 SS 414, p. 12423.
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graft stemming from this arrangement discredited not only him personally,
but the entire Ming-chou group.
The death of Cheng Ch’ing-chih in 1251 marked the end of an era in
Sung history. By a combination of sheer coincidence and clever orchestration,
Ming-chou natives had been an influential political force for nearly a half
century, surviving Shih Mi-yu¨an by nearly two decades. Never before had
the region known such political stature, and it never would again. Until
the end of the dynasty, Ming-chou provincials continued to produce great
numbers of metropolitan and regional officials, but they no longer dominated
the court. Responsibility for this lies squarely with Shih Sung-chih and Cheng
Ch’ing-chih. Shih Mi-yu¨an may have been censured for encroaching upon the
privileges of the emperor, but he had never been known for corruption or graft.
He may have indulged in political favoritism, but he did not give his wife and
children a free run of the court. His successors from Ming-chou proved far less
scrupulous, which gave public opinion grounds to denounce them and make
future advancement difficult for others from Ming-chou.
Filling the vacuum
When Cheng Ch’ing-chih died in 1251, the emperor reportedly contem-
plated recalling Shih Sung-chih.87 Either in response to or in anticipation
of widespread opposition, he instead selected Hsieh Fang-shu as councilor
of the left and Wu Ch’ien as councilor of the right.88 A native of western
Szechwan’s Wei-chou6, Hsieh Fang-shu had received Shih Sung-chih’s ini-
tial recommendation for office, but Hsieh had tended to be critical of his
sponsor and sympathetic toward the moralist opposition. His relations with
Cheng Ch’ing-chih had been more cordial, which enabled him to rise to assis-
tant councilor, and placed him in a position to be made Cheng’s successor. Wu
Ch’ien, a native of Ning-kuo (in modern Anhwei province) and the top-ranked
chin-shih in 1217, had also served under Cheng Ch’ing-chih as assistant coun-
cilor. Although he had opposed the military offensive of 1234, this did not
preclude his collaboration with Cheng Ch’ing-chih in the late 1240s.
That Cheng Ch’ing-chih’s successors were to be his own handpicked subor-
dinates may partly reflect imperial confidence in the senior statesman’s good
judgment; Cheng had been the emperor’s tutor, after all. The selection of
Hsieh Fang-shu and Wu Ch’ien also reflects the emperor’s desire to maintain
administrative continuity at a time of military and economic upheaval. The
empire might have fared better, however, with discontinuity, for the old poli-
cies were neither insightful nor flexible. In border affairs, even ten years after
87 HTC (1958) 173, p. 4718.
88 SS 417, pp. 12510–12; Wu Ch’ien’s biography is in SS 418, pp. 12515–20.
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the initial Mongol victories, the Sung was no closer to security with peace or
preparedness for war. Although the court lavished retrospective honors on the
Tao-hsu¨eh masters of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the moral message
these intellectuals had advocated had no noticeable impact upon the personal
lives of the emperor or of his trusted ministers. As Wu Ch’ien lectured Li-
tsung on curbing his sensual indulgences and reining in palace favorites who
encroached upon the imperial authority, his colleague Hsieh Fang-shu had
sabotaged the effort by routinely permitting members of his own family to
intrude into political matters. Under censorial indictment, Wu Ch’ien fell
from power after scarcely a year in office. The emperor’s patience was no doubt
worn thin by Wu’s annoying diligence in scrutinizing affairs within the palace.
Hsieh Fang-shu dominated the bureaucracy for the next three years. His per-
sonal influence over the throne, however, was never significant, and he fell,
uneventfully after censorial indictment, in the summer of 1255. Both coun-
cilors had failed in their commitment to deliver Li-tsung from the grip of
well-entrenched and resourceful eunuchs serving in the inner palace.
To the outer court, the eunuchs Tung Sung-ch’en and Lu Yu¨n-sheng were
the palace figures most responsible for the throne’s indifference to the details of
governance.89 The most hated eunuch of the thirteenth century, Tung enjoyed
the emperor’s favor for the last two decades of the reign. Court officials accused
Tung Sung-ch’en of accepting bribes for political favors, arranging choice
appointments for relatives of palace women, and encouraging the emperor
in his theatrical amusements and carnal indulgences, including the notori-
ous summoning of local prostitutes to the palace in 1255. In times of severe
economic hardship, Tung allegedly confiscated privately owned lands to erect
pleasure pavilions for the emperor. Tung even dared, according to critics, to
participate in ceremonies at the Imperial Ancestral Temple (T’ai-miao), a pro-
found insult to royal ancestors that implied treacherous ambitions.90 Such
charges were probably exaggerated if not altogether fabricated and may only
reflect later historians’ condemnation of eunuch power. Nonetheless, they sig-
nal an ascendency of the inner court over the outer court. By this stage of both
Li-tsung’s reign eunuchs and consorts, two groups more frequently political
competitors than collaborators, had learned to cooperate, an inauspicious devel-
opment from the perspective of outer court officials. This was the first time in
Li-tsung’s reign that he placed his trust not in bureaucratic executives but in
eunuchs. Most of the political infighting in the 1250s centered on the contest
between eunuch power and bureaucratic authority.
89 SS 469, pp. 13675–6; Chou Mi, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1983) 7, pp. 120–5.
90 On these charges, see SS 411, p. 12358; 474, p. 13782; HTC (1958) 174, p. 4748; 174, pp. 4750–63;
Hsu¨ Ching-sun, Chu¨-shan ts’un-kao [Ssu-k’u ch’u¨an-shu, Wen-yu¨an ko 1779 ed.] (13th c.; Taipei, 1976) 1,
pp. 27a–31b.
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Wu Ch’ien had cautioned the court against the influence of inner court staff,
but to no avail. In 1255, Censor Hung T’ien-hsi (chin-shih 1226) denounced
eunuch power as well, and resigned when the emperor was unresponsive. Stu-
dents at the Imperial University and prominent officials rushed to the censor’s
defense, which further polarized the court. Hsieh Fang-shu maintained a low
profile during the controversy, and this led to accusations, unsubstantiated but
also difficult to refute, that he had formed some secret liaison with eunuchs. His
credibility shattered, Hsieh stepped down. The conflict between bureaucratic
professionals and imperial favorites festered.
The emperor appointed Tung Huai (chin-shih 1213), a native of the border
city of Hao-chou, to be Hsieh’s successor. Like some earlier councilors, Tung
Huai had close ties to the Tao-hsu¨eh movement; unlike most, his lengthy career
had been devoted largely to regional office, with his first appointment in the
capital coming only six years before his elevation to the councilorship. This
proved a serious handicap. Probably close to seventy, Tung Huai’s candid yet
tactful approach to counseling the throne earned him the emperor’s respect
but not necessarily his confidence. The problem of eunuch power persisted,
compounded by imperial indulgence of various other favorites. Male relatives
of the empress, favored consorts, even Taoist nuns received special conferrals
of bureaucratic rank and office. One Tao-hsu¨eh proponent at the Ministry of
Works, Mou Tzu-ts’ai (chin-shih 1223), resigned in outrage at such impropri-
eties. His departure and that of Hung T’ien-hsi, which roughly coincided, left
Tung Huai alone in the struggle against palace favorites. Unfortunately, his
enemies were not confined to the inner court.
The one figure in the outer court who incurred the wrath of the civil service
more than did the palace favorites was the knavish Ting Ta-ch’u¨an (chin-shih
1238). A native of Chen-chiang (near the Yangtze River in Kiangsu), Ting held
various regional posts prior to entering the metropolitan bureaucracy in the
early 1250s. According to traditional accounts, Ting’s advancement to policy
monitor and palace censor derived directly from the relationships he cultivated
with the imperial concubine Yen and the eunuchs Tung Sung-ch’en and Lu
Yu¨n-sheng. However, Ting Ta-ch’u¨an possessed examination credentials and
had a long record of regional service. He was not altogether unqualified to
participate in government. His association with palace favorites appears unde-
niable, but whether the liaisons occurred before or after his political ascent is
unknown.
Ting’s undisguised ambition and political maneuverings were widely crit-
icized, and no bureaucrat was more incensed by them than the chief councilor
Tung Huai. From early on, Tung admonished the throne to advance talented
men and curb the influence of relatives, and by implication their confederates.
Ting Ta-ch’u¨an allegedly made friendly overtures, but Tung Huai responded
in mid-1256 by denouncing him as vile and threatening to resign if the censor
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remained in his post. Li-tsung preferred inaction, but not Censor Ting, who
in an unprecedented display of arrogance led a hundred palace guardsmen to
the councilor’s home. Under the cover of darkness, Tung Huai was dragged
off to the law enforcement office, no doubt threatened with torture, and then
crudely deposited outside the city walls. More than just a humiliating insult to
an elder statesman, this also represented an outrageous affront to bureaucratic
authority. The emperor officially ordered the councilor’s dismissal a day later,
in effect justifying after the fact Censor Ting’s excess. This was no consolation
for Tung Huai’s many sympathizers, who launched a major political campaign
against Ting. At its forefront were students at the Imperial University, who
demanded exile for the insubordinate censor. The emperor, ordinarily inclined
to compromise, must have been unusually piqued. He ordered eight students
at the university and seven at the Imperial Clan Academy, the alleged provo-
cateurs, to be rounded up and banished to the far south. He also instructed
university officials to restore order to the campus and curb political activism
there.91 These actions by the emperor represented a major political setback for
Tung Huai’s supporters and a reassertion of the imperial will.
The successor of Tung Huai was Ch’eng Yu¨an-feng (chin-shih 1228), a Hui-
chou (Anhwei) native with professorial status at both the Imperial University
and the Imperial Clan Academy.92 Having applied the stick, the emperor
may have used Ch’eng’s appointment as a carrot to appease the disaffected.
When Ch’eng Yu¨an-feng had been an investigating censor, he was critical of
the moribund Cheng Ch’ing-chih administration and the political decadence
it tolerated. Such views ensured Ch’eng’s support by Tao-hsu¨eh proponents.
Yet Ch’eng Yu¨an-feng clearly anticipated stormy waters, for he declined the
councilorship several times before submitting to imperial pressure.
Beginning in the summer of 1256 and for nearly two years after, Ch’eng
remained the court’s sole councilor; yet as long as Ting Ta-ch’u¨an held Li-
tsung’s confidence, Ch’eng would never function as chief policy maker. The
decision to banish university students, coinciding with the fourth month of
Ch’eng Yu¨an-feng’s term, must have come as a personal, not just a political, set-
back. As a former professor and current chief councilor he was unable to shield
defenseless students from intimidation by his subordinates. This inability
to act constituted an embarrassing image of political impotence. Conditions
along the border inspired no optimism either. Under Ch’eng Yu¨an-feng, Sung
and Mongol armies clashed with greater frequency and intensity, as Mo¨ngke
prepared for a renewed Mongol offensive. The Mongol assault on Szechwan
that began in 1258, and lasted nearly two years, represented by far the most
91 On the incident, see SS 44, p. 857; 405, p. 12242; 414, p. 12432; 474, pp. 13778–9; HTC (1958) 174,
pp. 4761–2, 4764.
92 SS 418, pp. 12520–3.
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intense fighting in two decades. From the outset of his tenure in 1256, Coun-
cilor Ch’eng had aggressively promoted the strengthening of border defenses,
no doubt having anticipated an escalation of fighting. Yet his only notable
achievement was augmenting the standing army by a hundred thousand men.
He devised no imaginative scheme for financing an expanding war, no new
strategy to counter the Mongol initiative in Szechwan, and no peace alter-
native should the fortunes of war turn unfavorable. Immersed in petty court
squabbles, he lost sight of these far more pressing issues.
Only a few months into the new conflict, in the spring of 1258, Ch’eng
Yu¨an-feng stepped down. His replacement was Ting Ta-ch’u¨an, an unfortunate
choice. Despite the Mongol offensive in the west, which grew progressively
more ferocious during the Ting Ta-ch’u¨an years, Ting is charged by traditional
historians with being oblivious to the crisis. Initially refuting his predecessor’s
warning about inadequate defenses, he later imposed a ban on all discussion
of the border situation.93 The effort to silence the war debate, whether it was
motivated by political intolerance or by concern over troop morale and popular
support, proved unproductive and unenforceable, another blemish on Ting’s
already tarnished reputation. Even allowing for historical bias, Ting Ta-ch’u¨an
was the most imprudent of Li-tsung’s fifteen councilor appointees. He had
negligible exposure to military affairs, inexperience that an empire at war
could ill afford. Ting’s appointment was unwise for another reason. His crude
insolence in the ouster of Tung Hai and unseemly ties to the inner court ensured
that Ting Ta-ch’u¨an, as councilor, was perpetually at odds with moralist critics.
The Sung court faced new internal conflicts that were additional drains on
valuable resources. Unfortunately, the arrogant use of power and disinclination
to tolerate criticism influenced Li-tsung as well. After decades of conflict within
the intellectual and political communities, a weary Li-tsung lost his former
political tolerance.
the rise of chia ssu-tao
The emperor finally dismissed and abandoned Ting Ta-ch’u¨an in Novem-
ber of 1259. Censorial indictments provided the pretext, and serious mili-
tary setbacks in Szechwan the occasion. The elderly Wu Ch’ien returned to
Lin-an as councilor of the left, but he held the post for only a half year. Court
attention instead focused on the new councilor of the right, Chia Ssu-tao
(1213–75).94 A native of T’ai-chou, in coastal Chekiang, he was the son of
93 SS 438, p. 12988; 474, pp. 13778–9; HTC (1958) 175, pp. 4776–7.
94 Biographical information can be found in Herbert Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275): A ‘bad last
minister’?” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif.,
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Shantung commissioner Chia She and the brother of Li-tsung’s once favored
Consort Chia. Even though he lacked chin-shih credentials, by all indications
he had held the high regional posts of prefect, pacification commissioner, and
fiscal overseer, all while still in his thirties. These promotions were rare even for
degree holders, and Chia Ssu-tao’s meteoric rise can be explained only by his
natural talent, backed by family privilege, most probably the favor enjoyed by
Consort Chia. But he was an unusually experienced official. Most of his early
career was spent in regional offices, but his extensive exposure to military
matters resulted in an appointment as associate administrator at the Bureau
of Military Affairs in 1254, his first executive post in the capital. The timing
was more than coincidental.
From early on, Li-tsung had apparently been on close personal terms with
Chia Ssu-tao, who was eight years his junior. In the mid-1230s, when both
men were in their twenties, the emperor had commented, with envy, on Chia
Ssu-tao’s amorous escapades. Rumor had it that they subsequently caroused
together.95 Following the death of Cheng Ch’ing-chih in 1251, the emperor’s
only notable close acquaintance from his early years still alive and politically
active was Chia Ssu-tao. Employing him in high office must have seemed only
natural to an emperor known for his loyalty to old friends.
In assessing the reasons for Chia Ssu-tao’s advancement, it would be unfair,
as Herbert Franke demonstrates, to focus exclusively on Chia’s personal ties
and ignore his official record. In the decade preceding his appointment to the
Bureau of Military Affairs, Chia Ssu-tao served as commissioner for Chiang-nan
West, Ching-hu, and the Yangtze region – all strategically vital areas that gave
Chia valuable professional experience. Increasingly, Chia Ssu-tao identified
himself with the military bureaucracy. This may reflect the influence of his
father, who similarly lacked examination credentials and exploited military
service to win quasi-military posts ordinarily beyond the reach of those without
the chin-shih degree. Yet the appointment had plenty of recent precedents.
Shih Sung-chih and Chao K’uei had both acquired councilorships through
their distinction as military leaders, although Shih had obtained examination
degrees as well. Because of the military crisis at hand, Li-tsung needed to place
an unusually high premium on military expertise, in some ways countering
the Sung dynasty’s practice of disdaining martial skills. This may be also seen
in Li-tsung’s frequent advancement of military men to eminent civilian posts,
1962), pp. 217–34; Fang Chen-hua, “Wan Sung cheng-cheng tui pien-fang ti ying-hsiang,” Ta-lu tsa-
chih 88 No. 5 (1994), pp. 19–31; Miyazaki Ichisada, “Ko Jido¯ ryakuden,” To¯yo¯shi kenkyu¯ 6 No. 3 (1941),
pp. 54–73; Herbert Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976),
vol. 1, pp. 203–7; SS 474, pp. 13779–87; Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien 18, pp. 1006–18.
95 Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien 18, pp. 1006–18.
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and in the temporary revival of the special military councilorship in the 1230s.
Moreover, Li-tsung’s high regard for Chia Ssu-tao appears to have been shared
and reinforced by others. Shih Yen-chih (fl. 1217–60), prefect of Lin-an and
brother of Shih Sung-chih, had once remarked to the throne, “Although Ssu-
tao has the habits of youth [in being so carefree], his talents are capable of
extensive use.”96 At the time, Chia Ssu-tao was still in his early twenties and
already marked for advancement.
There was never a political honeymoon for the new councilor. Many bureau-
crats, considering him an extension of inner court influence in the tradition of
Ting Ta-ch’u¨an, held Chia Ssu-tao in profound contempt from the outset. But
his favored sister, the Consort Chia, had died in 1247 over a decade before his
nomination as councilor, and the emperor had since taken up with other con-
sorts. Chia’s great civil service attainments cannot be explained simply with
reference to her influence. Nor is there evidence to document Chia Ssu-tao’s
alliance with any specific court faction. His appointment to the Bureau of Mil-
itary Affairs occurred under Hsieh Fang-shu, and to assistant councilor under
Tung Huai and Ch’eng Yu¨an-feng. These were all men highly regarded for
their professional integrity. If not personally responsible for his advancement,
at least the three did nothing to block it. Eight months into the tenure of
Ting Ta-ch’u¨an, Chia Ssu-tao was appointed as supreme commander for the
Huai region. His return to regional military service may reflect heightened
concern over the worsening border situation, yet it may also imply an unhar-
monious relationship with Ting Ta-ch’u¨an. Upon becoming councilor, Chia
Ssu-tao moved to eliminate the political cronies of Ting Ta-ch’u¨an and Tung
Sung-ch’en,97 and he intentionally distanced himself from earlier favorites and
their policies. For example, contemporary critics allege that when Tung Sung-
ch’en had proposed, in the wake of a threatening enemy offensive in 1259,
that the capital be moved to Ming-chou, an action that Councilor Wu Ch’ien
endorsed,98 Chia Ssu-tao reportedly rejected such defeatism and insisted on
a firm stand at the border, to project an image of fortitude and resolve. Still,
his bold determination did not dispel the shadow of official criticism or the
rumors of spineless pacifism.
Fiscal crisis and land policy
The empire under Li-tsung was beset with difficult problems, but none more
intractable than the economy. Accumulation of land by the wealthy, commonly
96 SS 474, p. 13780.
97 HTC (1958) 175, p. 4788; 176, p. 4798.
98 Huang Kan, Mien-chai chi [Ssu-k’u ch’u¨an-shu, Wen-yu¨an ko 1779 ed.] (Taipei, 1971) 38, p. 29a; SS 173,
pp. 4179–80.
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designated as “monopolists” (chien-ping chih chia), had plagued Sung soci-
ety since the early eleventh century, a problem frequently mentioned but
never resolved. Land accumulation inevitably affected government revenues,
for influential landowners, legally or otherwise, could claim exemptions and
evade taxation more effectively than could simple peasants. In the thirteenth
century, new strains on the economy created new pressures for government
intervention. Early in the tenure of Shih Mi-yu¨an, Li Tao-ch’uan (chin-shih
1196), brother of famed historian Li Hsin-ch’uan and a professor at the Impe-
rial University, had demanded the imposition of strict limits on landholding.
Hsieh Fang-shu had also made a similar recommendation in 1246, a few years
before becoming councilor.99 The devastation imposed by natural disasters and
the revenues consumed by prolonged war left the court with few alternatives
besides coercive action. After several years of deliberation, Chia Ssu-tao’s first
move was to conduct a massive land survey (probably in 1262). By correcting
tax registers that no longer reflected the rural landholding, Chia hoped to
identify tax evaders and increase revenues. This was followed, in 1263, by the
public fields (kung-t’ien) measure.
Public fields was a policy that had been put forward during the last years of
the Northern Sung and originally was devised to defray military expenditures.
It had the same basic function in the 1260s.100 Chia Ssu-tao also abolished
the old Harmonious Grain (ho-ti) levy, which compelled farmers to sell grain
to the government at artificially low prices for use as army provisions. Abo-
lition of the practice, a source of considerable discontent, must have been
welcome, but Chia Ssu-tao did not act out of charity. Large landholdings in
the hands of powerful landlords able to claim exemptions made even ordinary
land taxes formidably difficult to collect and must also have radically reduced
procurement of supplementary taxes such as the Harmonious Grain levy. The
government seemed to have only two options: redistribute land among poor,
tax-paying peasants, an administratively onerous task, or seize private lands for
the state. Chia Ssu-tao took the second path. He restricted the landholdings of
tax-exempt officials and mandated that the state purchase one-third of all hold-
ings in excess of two hundred mu (approximately thirty acres). Initially, this
program was implemented near the capital; later, it was extended to most of
the southeast. It was applied first to official households and then was expanded
99 SS 417, pp. 12510–11; 425, pp. 12670–1.
100 On land tenure and reform for the era, see Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275),” pp. 229–31; Chao
Ya-shu, “Sung-tai ti t’ien-fu chih-tu yu¨ t’ien-fu shou-ju chuang k’uang” (M.A. thesis, Kuo-li T’ai-wan
ta-hsu¨eh, 1969), pp. 85–94; Chang Yin-lin, “Nan Sung wang-kuo shih pu,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi:
Ti erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1964), pp. 105–22, especially pp. 117–22; Ch’en Teng-
yu¨an, Chung-kuo t’u-ti chih-tu (Shanghai, 1932), pp. 195–200; Liang Keng-yao, Nan Sung ti nung-ts’un
ching-chi (Taipei, 1984), pp. 83–150; SS 173, pp. 4194–5; HTC (1958) 177, p. 4837; Chou, Ch’i-tung
yeh-yu¨ (1983) 17, pp. 313–17; Hsu¨, Chu¨-shan ts’un-kao 3, pp. 15a–17a.
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to cover all landowners. Moreover, the two hundred mu exemption was soon
cut in half. Because the government lacked the financial resources to offer ade-
quate compensation, some landowners received as little as five percent of their
land’s market value. There were other inequities as well. Payment for larger
holdings was generally made not in cash, but in progressively larger quantities
of inflated paper currency, tax remission certificates, or worse yet, certificates
conferring official status. This policy made the state the largest landowner in
the empire. For example, the government claimed a reported twenty percent of
all arable land in Che-hsi circuit.101 Although many officials appreciated the
seriousness of the financial crisis facing the Sung, few endorsed Chia Ssu-tao’s
overhaul of the entire landowning system. Such objections by officials may
have reflected their self-interest, for officials constituted a significant share of
the landowning population, but genuine policy differences were also at work.
The most difficult aspect of the public fields initiative was implementa-
tion. Local officials, pressured by the Sung court, often confiscated more land
than stipulated while compensating the owners with less than the regulations
obliged. In their misguided enthusiasm, some local officials went so far as to
threaten noncomplying landowners with mutilation and other illegal punish-
ments. Critics charged that the program “disturbed the people” (jao-min).102
By “people,” they seemed to have meant rich landlords and officials, those
with the most wealth to lose. When the government confiscated up to twenty
percent of a region’s arable land, when it attempted to manage vast state
holdings without substantially augmenting its civil service, when it flagrantly
undercut the interests of precisely the group responsible for implementing
its measures, during a time of military conflict, political disruption of some
sort was inevitable. Had Chia Ssu-tao redistributed land among poor peas-
ants rather than claiming everything for the state, the program may have won
greater acceptance. Instead, he strengthened the state at the expense of the
people, alienating rich landlords and landless peasants alike. Moreover, as the
Sung court lacked the resources to supervise state lands, mismanagement and
neglect were unavoidable. The public fields program lasted, at least nomi-
nally, for twelve years, an exceedingly long life for such a contentious and
ill-conceived policy.
Success or failure of the public fields policy aside, Chia Ssu-tao faced an
old and difficult problem of revenue shortfall that less courageous predecessors
had evaded. He also showed courage in curtailing the privileges of the ruling
elite and landowning class to which he himself belonged, scholar-officialdom.
Later writers often compared Chia Ssu-tao to Wang Mang, a minister and then
101 Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275),” p. 230.
102 Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 98, p. 1087.
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emperor (r. 9–23) who ended the Western Han dynasty (206 b.c.e.–8 c.e.).
Wang Mang undertook drastic land reform and impoverished the wealthy.103
However, this comparison is exaggerated.104 The Sung government confiscated
only one-third of excess holdings and offered compensation, however modest.
It also provided tax relief through the abolition of the Harmonious Grain
system. All this suggests intentional moderation on Chia’s part. However,
Chia Ssu-tao and Li-tsung were viewed as hypocrites for demanding sacrifice
from others while spending lavishly on themselves. In 1262, a year before the
public fields measure, the emperor had built, at state expense, a private home
and ancestral temple for Chia Ssu-tao. Costing a million strings of cash, the
buildings probably rivaled even imperial structures in their sumptuousness.105
This extravagance, compounded with the emperor’s lavish expenditures within
his own palace, must have left many dispossessed landowners embittered,
certain that revenues earned from their former lands would only be squandered
on imperial frivolities.
Bureaucratic discontent was also directed toward Chia Ssu-tao’s conduct
of foreign policy. As noted earlier, the armies of Khubilai had largely with-
drawn from the south following Mo¨ngke’s death in 1259. At that point, they
decided to test the diplomatic waters, sending a peace envoy, Hao Ching, to
the Sung in the spring of 1260. Sixty miles into Sung territory, at Chen-chou2,
a border official arrested him. This arrest was allegedly made on orders from
the chief councilor without the emperor’s knowledge.106 In light of the acute
vulnerability of its southwest, the Sung could scarcely afford to offer such
provocation to the enemy. Moreover, with the Sung having apparently made
peace overtures to the Mongols only a year earlier, the sudden change in atti-
tude is rather baffling. Hao Ching was suspected, by some reports, to be a spy.
If true, a more responsible court would have simply turned him away at the
border, rather than further provoke the Mongols by incarcerating their envoy.
Other reports allude to some secret understanding between the councilor and
the Mongols, concluded during the pressures of the 1259 offensive, which
had offered what in retrospect represented politically awkward concessions.
For fear of these concessions being made public, Chia Ssu-tao isolated Hao
103 See Hans Bielenstein, “Wang Mang, the restoration of the Han dynasty, and Later Han,” in The Cambridge
history of China, volume 1: The Ch’in and Han empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, ed. Denis C. Twitchett and
Michael Loewe (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 232–51.
104 Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao,” p. 231 n. 61.
105 Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien 18, p. 924; SS 45, p. 880. See also Richard L. Davis, Wind against the
mountain: The crisis of politics and culture in thirteenth-century China (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), pp. 42–6.
106 Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 206, pp. 4591–4; HTC (1958) 176, p. 4802; Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–
1275),” pp. 226–9; Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His life and times (Berkeley, Calif., 1988), pp. 56, 81;
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 260–9; Li, Yu¨an-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 266–7.
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Ching. As demonstrated by Herbert Franke, documents given to the envoy
contain no reference to tribute payment or to any previous concessions.107 The
only feasible explanation for Sung intransigence in this case is the weight of
revanchist bureaucratic opinion.
For much of the thirteenth century, the Sung bureaucracy had favored
arms over negotiation, activism over passivism, and had taken a dim view of
appeasement: Shih Mi-yu¨an had been criticized by Chia She for using wealth
and office to buy the loyalties of Li Ch’u¨an, Shih Sung-chih had been denounced
for compromising revanchist idealism in the base pursuit of peace, Ting Ta-
ch’u¨an had been criticized for doing too little to strengthen border defenses,
and Tung Sung-ch’en had come under fire for proposing a tactical retreat by
relocating the capital farther southeast. In this general atmosphere of militancy,
Chia Ssu-tao, as a councilor still new to the office, could not afford to incur
the bureaucracy’s wrath. His apparent indifference to the threat posed by
the Mongols may also relate to his doubts about Mongol intentions. Having
rebuffed Sung overtures a year earlier, the Mongols’ sudden interest in talks
would naturally have aroused suspicion.
In the early part of 1261, Chia Ssu-tao faced a new challenge caused by the
loyalists of Shantung. Thirty years before, in 1231, Sung armies had killed Li
Ch’u¨an, following his abortive invasion of the south. Li Ch’u¨an’s wife, Yang
Miao-chen, had then led her remnant armies in retreat to the northeast, never
again to threaten the south. Li T’an, the adopted son of the two, had inher-
ited their base at I-tu (near modern Ch’ing-chou, in central Shantung). The
Mongols subsequently entrusted Li T’an with control over much of Shan-
tung, hoping eventually to unleash the Shantung armies upon the Sung. With
expanded aid from Khubilai, Li T’an began to harass the Sung border in 1261.
His intention, however, must have been to obtain, by coercion if necessary,
support from the Sung, for in March 1262, in the most stunning defection
of the Li-tsung reign, Li T’an turned on the Mongols and declared fealty to
the Sung.108 The move was perhaps inspired by greed, as Li had been dis-
appointed with Mongol aid, or perhaps by opportunism, with Li seeking to
exploit Mongol preoccupations in the west to assert his control in the east, or
perhaps by fear, with Li apprehensive about his place in the long-term Mongol
plans for Shantung. Whatever his motives, the decision to ally himself with
the Sung, the government responsible for his father’s death, rather than declare
107 Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275),” pp. 226–9.
108 On the Li T’an affair, see Sung et al., Yu¨an shih 206, pp. 4591–6; HTC (1958) 176, pp. 4819–24; Li,
Sung Yu¨an chan-shih, pp. 863–74; Li, Yu¨an-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 267–73; Otagi Matsuo, “Ri Tan
no hanran to sono seijiteki igi – Mo¯ko¯cho¯ chika ni okeru Kanchi no ho¯kensei to sono shu¯kensei e no
tenkai,” To¯yo¯shi kenkyu¯ 6 No. 4 (1941), pp. 1–26.
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independence from both the Mongols and the Sung, suggests that Li T’an had
been given a substantial incentive. The Sung court must have made an irre-
sistible bid for his loyalty. As bureaucratic chief, Chia Ssu-tao would deserve
some credit for this. But the risks in this venture turned out to be too great
for Chia Ssu-tao.
In contrast to his father, Li T’an commanded an unimpressive army of
roughly twenty thousand men, which posed no serious military challenge to
Khubilai. For Li to become a serious challenger, the Sung would have had to
commit to Shantung, on short notice, a very large army of reinforcements,
weakening their defenses elsewhere. Chia Ssu-tao had no manpower to do
this, even if he wished to do so, and refused to take advantage of Li T’an’s
offer. Consequently, the Li T’an uprising lasted scarcely a month. The Sung
accomplished nothing in the venture, save for further provoking the new
Mongol ruler. Only one year earlier, a prominent commander at Lu-chou3,
Liu Cheng, had defected to the Mongols, thereby strengthening their hand
in the west in Szechwan. The rebellion of Li T’an, by forcing the Mongols to
assert their authority in the Shantung region, brought new pressure against
the Southern Sung on another front.
Tao-hsu¨eh and the Imperial University
Perceiving failures in Sung political leadership and the increased foreign mil-
itary threat, the students at the Imperial University (T’ai-hsu¨eh) emerged in
Li-tsung’s reign as a potent political influence. In the last years of the Northern
Sung, students had been vocal critics of government policy, but their activism
erupted in a brief and violent episode that held no prospect of sustaining itself.
Activism in the Southern Sung dated from the early Ning-tsung years, when
students had protested the dismissals in 1195 of Li Hsiang (chin-shih 1163) and
Yang Chien (1140–1226), men identified with Chao Ju-yu¨ and openly hostile
toward Han T’o-chou. Li Hsiang, then chancellor (chi-chiu) of the Directorate
of Education (Kuo-tzu chien), held professorships at both the Imperial Univer-
sity and the Directorate. No less distinguished was Yang Chien, a professor
at the university and an eminent philosopher. The 1195 protest had helped
polarize officialdom when Han T’o-chou responded by banishing the student
ringleader to distant Ling-nan. Eight years later, when one brazen youth at
the Military Academy had verbally accosted Han T’o-chou, his temerity was
rewarded with arrest and exile.109 These arrests had hardly endeared Han
109 On these incidents, see SS 407, pp. 12289–90; 455, pp. 13369, 13372–8; Wang, “Sung-tai t’ai-hsu¨eh
yu¨ t’ai-hsu¨eh-sheng,” pp. 260–1, 298–306; Thomas H. C. Lee, Government education and examinations in
Sung China (New York, 1985), pp. 186–96.
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T’o-chou to students, but the coercion had succeeded in keeping university
campuses relatively quiet.
Shih Mi-yu¨an’s approach to handling student critics was entirely different.
Avoiding confrontation, he courted men popular at the university, especially
Tao-hsu¨eh proponents. He appointed, for example, Chen Te-hsiu, an individual
with impeccable moralist credentials, as university professor. There was always
an element of tension between the pacifist councilor and the revanchist uni-
versity leaders, but such tension never escalated into confrontation. Despite
his long and controversial tenure, Shih Mi-yu¨an drew no more than minor
criticism from students.110
Compromises made by Shih Mi-yu¨an should not cloud the fact that he was
a clever manipulator who apparently controlled students through their pro-
fessors. With roughly sixteen hundred students and only three professors, not
counting many more lecturers, at the university, such manipulation was fea-
sible. University appointments required special examination credentials, yet
approval of appointments rested with the chief councilor, and Shih Mi-yu¨an
exploited this prerogative.111 In this way, Cheng Ch’ing-chih, the chief coun-
cilor’s closest confidant, received appointments to the Imperial University, the
Directorate of Education, and the Imperial Clan Academy. As a university
official at the time of Li-tsung’s controversial succession, Cheng’s presence,
more than any other single factor, explains the lack of student criticism of the
affair. Other Ming-chou natives or close associates of the councilor also received
teaching or administrative assignments at the university, including Ying Yao,
Hsu¨an Tseng, Yu¨an Hsieh, Ch’iao Hsing-chien, and many of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s
own kinsmen. At least eight of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s collateral nephews were identi-
fied with the university in or around the time of his councilorship.112 Not all
these kinsmen approved of their uncle, and some even criticized him publicly,
but as a whole they probably had a generally moderating effect on student
opinion.
The successors of Shih Mi-yu¨an, lacking his skills in political manipulation,
were often humbled by pressures from the university. The first major clash of
the Li-tsung reign between the bureaucratic leadership and university students
occurred during the years of Shih Sung-chih’s dominance, from 1241 to 1245.
The younger Shih’s elevation to chief councilor in 1239 was poorly received at
110 SS 419, pp. 12555–6; 420, pp. 12572–4; 423, p. 12629; Ch’en Teng-yu¨an, Kuo-shih chiu-wen (Peking,
1958) 35, p. 378.
111 SS 246, p. 8736; 400, pp. 12146–7; 419, p. 12543; 420, p. 12571; Huang et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an
73, pp. 1278, 1388.
112 SS 423, pp. 12637–8; Lou Yu¨eh [Yao], Kung-k’uei chi [Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (c. early
13th c.; Taipei, 1979) 105, p. 11b; Tai Mei et al., Hsin-hsiu Yin-hsien chih (1877) 20, p. 35a; Hsiao-shan
Shih-shih tsung-p’u [Columbia University copy] (n.p., 1892) 5, pp. 31b, 32b, 41a, 45a.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.013
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 21:48:56, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
the reign of li-tsung 899
the university, and complaints arose early on. Students later criticized Shih’s
pacifist inclinations and found fault with the Shih family’s domination at
court.113 These issues did not suddenly emerge under Shih Sung-chih; it is
merely that students had won, for the first time in three or four decades, the
courage to address their political concerns in a public, confrontational manner.
Their courage stemmed from the new councilor’s background. For virtually
his entire career, Shih Sung-chih had served away from the court. Even as
chief councilor, various military responsibilities often took him away from
Lin-an. Unlike his uncle, Shih Sung-chih did not have the extensive network
of contacts within the metropolitan bureaucracy and the university necessary
to manipulate or influence political opinion in the capital. Shih Sung-chih
had also struck an unseemly image of a professional bureaucrat, an unscholarly
official with scant interest in the ethical concerns of philosophers and students.
Never bothering to court Tao-hsu¨eh proponents as his uncle had done, he
probably underestimated the group’s importance in shaping political opinion.
Nothing incensed students more about Shih Sung-chih than his appar-
ent pacifism, for irredentism had an extraordinary appeal at the university.
This tradition drew some inspiration from the late Northern Sung, but it was
strengthened by the distinctive conditions of the diminished southern empire.
Tao-hsu¨eh ideas fueled such idealism. The leading Southern Sung thinker, Chu
Hsi, was a vocal proponent of an aggressive policy against the north. In his
1163 memorial to Hsiao-tsung, for example, he had endorsed the revanchist
policies of Councilor Chang Chu¨n. Despite the councilor’s ultimate defeat in
battle, Chu Hsi appears not to have changed his position, as evidenced by the
militancy of his later writings.114 Other statesmen and scholars, such as Yeh
Shih, Hsin Ch’i-chi, Ch’en Liang, and Chang Shih2, although coming from
quite different intellectual traditions, shared a radical militancy with Tao-
hsu¨eh proponents. Quite unlike the intellectuals, wielders of political power
tended toward pragmatic moderation, if not pacifism, in foreign policy, which
caused the two groups to clash often at court. For Tao-hsu¨eh proponents, these
differences went beyond policy convictions. Having achieved unparalleled
supremacy in the realm of thought, they felt they had consistently been denied
a share of political power commensurate with their intellectual standing.
113 Huang Hsien-fan, Sung-tai t’ai-hsu¨eh-sheng chiu-kuo yu¨n-tung (Shanghai, 1936), pp. 73–8.
114 Chu Hsi, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi [Ming Chia-ching 1522–66 ed.; Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an
ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1245; Taipei, 1979) 11, pp. 1a–40b; 13, pp. 1a–8a. Also see Conrad Schirokauer,
“Chu Hsi’s political career: A study in ambivalence,” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright
and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif., 1962), pp. 162–88; Brian E. McKnight, “Chu Hsi and his
world,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu, 1986), pp. 408–36, especially
pp. 422–5; Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo), The life and thought of Yeh Shih (Gainsesville, Fla., 1974),
pp. 57–74; SS 429, pp. 12751–70; Ch’en, Kuo-shih chiu-wen, pp. 374–9.
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But with the thirteenth-century court dominated by entrenched councilors and
their cliques, the prospects for effecting change, compared with the eleventh
and twelfth centuries, were diminished. To be sure, conflicting views on war
and peace often fell along outer and inner court lines, but militancy among
Tao-hsu¨eh proponents and their sympathizers also resulted from the group’s
profound sensitivity to the Sung dynasty’s crisis of legitimacy.
The Sung loss of its northern territories, including the Central Plains in
1126, to the Chin conquerors had dealt a severe blow to the Sung ruling house.
Descent from the Chao lineage offered Southern Sung rulers some legitimacy,
yet the raison d’eˆtre of any government-in-exile is the promise of eventual
return to full powers and restoration of lost lands. The harsh realities of Chin
strength and Sung weakness, however, left Sung statesmen and intellectuals
alike scrambling to address legitimacy issues, often using scholarship to serve
their political agenda. The compilation, Outline and details of the comprehensive
mirror (Tzu-chih t’ung-chien kang-mu), written under the auspices of Chu Hsi’s
students and published in 1172, offers a prime example.115 In their digest of
Ssu-ma Kuang’s massive history The comprehensive mirror for aid in government
(Tzu-chih t’ung-chien), the authors devoted much space to assessing the legit-
imacy of past dynasties. Their objective was to develop rules of legitimacy
that would firmly place the Southern Sung in a more favorable light than the
Chin.116 In addition to employing historical arguments, those using scholar-
ship to serve their political agenda also exploited philosophical legacies to aug-
ment the Sung dynasty’s political status. Southern Sung Tao-hsu¨eh proponents,
because of their close intellectual links with the distinctive Northern Sung
tradition of Chou Tun-i and the Ch’eng brothers, boldly declared a connection
between political succession and “Succession to the Way” (tao-t’ung), reasoning
that where philosophical orthodoxy lies, so does political legitimacy.117 This
ideological commitment to defending the dynasty came with a political agenda
of incessant pressure to recover the north. These revanchists often argued for
the restoration of the Sung’s former boundaries, but they had a scant appreci-
ation of the practical limits to state power. To a throne obsessed with its own
legitimacy, Tao-hsu¨eh proponents may have had irresistible appeal, but each
emperor who was temporarily won over to support their militancy – Hsiao-
tsung, Ning-tsung, and Li-tsung in turn – paid dearly for those sympathies.
115 Conrad Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s sense of history,” in Ordering the world: Approaches to state and society in
Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), p. 200.
116 Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s sense of history,” pp. 195–206; Jao Tsung-i, Chung-kuo shih-hsu¨eh-shang chih
cheng-t’ung lun: Chung-kuo shih-hsu¨eh kuan-nien t’an-t’ao chih i (Hong Kong, 1977), pp. 35–7; Ch’en
Ch’ing-ch’u¨an et al., Chung-kuo shih-hsu¨eh-chia p’ing-chuan (Cheng-chou, 1985), vol. 2, pp. 600–21.
117 Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: New studies (Honolulu, 1989), pp. 320–5; Richard L. Davis, “Historiography
as politics in Yang Wei-chen’s ‘Polemic on legitimate succession,’” T’oung Pao 69 Nos. 1–3 (1983),
pp. 33–72, especially pp. 40–2, 48, 69–70.
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In the end, moderates generally prevailed, but to do so the court had to sacrifice
the abstract enhancement of the legitimacy that the revanchists offered it for
the tangible maintenance of peace.
During the Sung, the influence of the Learning of the Way (Tao-hsu¨eh) at the
Imperial University fluctuated immensely. On the rise in late Northern Sung,
it entered a dramatic decline in the early Southern Sung due to the hostility
of power brokers at court such as Ch’in Kuei. Its fortunes improved modestly
under Hsiao-tsung, one of few emperors whose personal lifestyle came close to
the high moral standards set by the movement, but then declined again under
Ning-tsung. Of the most notable disciples of Chu Hsi listed in the Sung dynas-
tic history (Sung shih), only two can be identified with the university system.
Most of them apparently preferred to teach at state or privately run regional
academies, where they cultivated a growing body of followers.118 Initially
underrepresented at metropolitan institutions, and short on influential court
officers and university professors, the Tao-hsu¨eh movement figured prominently
in regional education; it was unmatched in the zeal with which it propagated
its ideas at the local level.119 By the early thirteenth century, the school’s
influence, once concentrated in the Fu-chien region, had spread throughout
the south. Men originally independent of the movement – Chen Te-hsiu and
Wei Liao-weng, to name two illustrious examples – came to sympathize with
its persecuted leaders and their moral message.120 Tao-hsu¨eh values were also
favorably received by some powerful bureaucrats, such as Cheng Ch’ing-chih
and Tung Huai, natives of Liang-che whose intellectual pedigrees differed radi-
cally from those of the Fu-chien school. The movement’s influence on education
ensured that it would eventually alter, however indirectly, the empire’s lead-
ing educational institution, the Imperial University. This expanded influence
also came about owing to a generally sympathetic leadership at court begin-
ning with Shih Mi-yu¨an.
The growing stature of the Tao-hsu¨eh at the Imperial University was related
to the curriculum. During the Northern Sung, the university had tended to
stress poetry. In the Southern Sung, it stressed the classics.121 The effect of
118 SS 429–30.
119 Hoyt C. Tillman, Confucian discourse and Chu Hsi’s ascendancy (Honolulu, 1992), pp. 37–42, 133–44,
231–4; Linda A. Walton, “The institutional context of Neo-Confucianism: Scholars, schools, and shu-
yu¨an in Sung-Yu¨an China,” in Neo-Confucian education: The formative stage, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary
and John W. Chaffee (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), pp. 457–92.
120 Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Wei Liao-weng’s thwarted statecraft,” in Ordering the world: Approaches
to state and society in Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley,
Calif., 1993), pp. 336–48; Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Chen Te-hsiu and statecraft,” in Ordering the
world: Approaches to state and society in Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer
(Berkeley, Calif., 1993), pp. 349–79.
121 Chao T’ieh-han, “Sung-tai ti t’ai-hsu¨eh,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti i chi, ed. Sung-shih yen-chiu-hui
(Taipei, 1958), pp. 317–56.
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this difference in emphasis is unmistakable. Since the Tao-hsu¨eh movement
produced the most prolific classicists of the thirteenth century, candidates
preparing for civil service examinations, including university students, were
almost certain to come under its influence. At the end of 1212 the university
formally adopted Chu Hsi’s commentaries on the Analects and the Mencius as
canonical, officially confirming the preeminence of Tao-hsu¨eh scholarship as an
intellectual force and also as the key to examination success.
The transfer of Tao-hsu¨eh ideas into political action owes something to the
emperor. Li-tsung bestowed court honors on leaders of the Tao-hsu¨eh movement
with extraordinary generosity. In 1227, Chu Hsi’s compilation of commen-
tary on the Four Books (Analects, Mencius, Chung-yung, and Ta-hsu¨eh) received
imperial sanction. In 1230 a descendant of Confucius was favored with a gov-
ernment post. In 1241 the posthumous ranks of Chou Tun-i, Chang Tsai, the
Ch’eng brothers, and Chu Hsi were all elevated and tablets for them placed
in the Temple of Confucius. Their teachings in effect were sanctioned as state
orthodoxy. But as demonstrated by James T. C. Liu, imperial goodwill was
hardly divorced from pragmatic politics.122 With his own succession shrouded
in controversy and with a new military power menacing the northern border,
Li-tsung exploited rapidly evolving intellectual and ideological traditions of
the Confucian canon to enhance the image of himself and his administration.
At the same time, he continued to indulge his material and sensual impulses in
flagrant violation of the high moral expectations of the Tao-hsu¨eh movement.
His hypocrisy angered many, Tu Fan being the most notable critic, yet most
aspiring officials could ill afford such candor. Unable to risk indicting the
emperor personally, they focused on his chief advisors instead, blaming them
for everything from enemy victories along the border, to irregularities in the
heavens, and even to the emperor’s sexual appetites.
Shih Sung-chih rose to the councilorship in the early 1240s, an exceedingly
troubled time. Natural disasters reduced hungry residents of the capital to can-
nibalism; heavenly portents foretold a grim future for the ruler and the ruled;
the Mongol offensive, though largely arrested, left a vast trail of devastation
and human suffering; and scandalous rumors about the emperor’s personal life
circulated widely. The spreading conviction that dynastic fortunes were taking
a turn for the worse, combined with Shih Sung-chih’s generally low standing at
the Imperial University, emboldened the students. The thrust of their indict-
ments was that Shih Sung-chih, by orchestrating his own recall following his
father’s death, had exhibited a lack of the important Confucian virtue of filial
piety. Being disloyal to his own father, how could he be loyal to his ruler?
122 Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “How did a Neo-Confucian school become the state orthodoxy?”
Philosophy East and West 23 No. 4 (1973), pp. 483–505.
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It was a moral indictment, and may well have been orchestrated by moralist
teachers or their associates in the capital. Certain university chancellors and
professors at the time were indirectly linked to the Tao-hsu¨eh movement, and
contemporary documents occasionally refer to students being encouraged in
their attacks by their teachers.123 Students and teachers in Lin-an interacted
freely, contravening the rules restricting such interaction in force during the
Northern Sung. At the same time, moralist elements had hardly overrun the
university. The most prominent chancellor under Shih Sung-chih, Chin Yu¨an
(chin-shih 1214), had no known ties to Tao-hsu¨eh.124 In all likelihood, students
were influenced by individual professors and administrators, but they were
more than mere pawns in a power struggle between bureaucratic insiders and
outsiders. On the contrary, once stirred by political events in the capital, they
quickly seized the initiative and became a vigorously independent force.
The confrontation between Shih Sung-chih and the Imperial University
students added a new dimension to Southern Sung politics. For the preceding
century, student outbursts had been infrequent and largely unfruitful. But as
the university grew in the early Southern Sung from a few hundred students
to over sixteen hundred by the early thirteenth century, numbers that were
augmented by the formation of the Military Academy and the Lin-an Academy
in the late twelfth century, so did the students’ potential to have an influence.125
Reflecting in part the confidence that comes with greater numbers, and by
sheer persistence, they won the resignation of Assistant Councilor Li Ming-
fu, a close associate of Shih Sung-chih, in early 1244.126 This victory, more
than any other factor, explains the students’ belligerence later in the year,
when controversy erupted over the recall from mourning of Shih Sung-chih.
Rather than act as individuals, as in the past, they acted as a group. One
hundred and forty students at the Imperial University, almost ten percent
of the student body, petitioned for Shih’s dismissal. With support from the
other metropolitan academies and from many officials in the civil service, they
immobilized the throne. Li-tsung yielded to their demands after three intense
months, and replaced Shih Sung-chih with Tu Fan, a favorite among the critics.
Student pressure had, almost on its own, destroyed a chief councilor, a victory
that legitimized student opinion while enhancing the university’s status. It
also, more importantly, exposed the chief councilor, and even the emperor, as
vulnerable to the forces of opinion. Li-tsung’s decision in 1245 to investigate
the questionable deaths of several of the critics of Shih Sung-chih, again a
123 SS 409, p. 12323; 418, p. 12529; 419, pp. 12553–5; 422, pp. 12614–15.
124 SS 419, pp. 12558–9.
125 SS 157, pp. 3685–6.
126 Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 53, pp. 8a–b.
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concession to student demands, only confirmed this. No longer, it seemed,
would the university be cowed by bureaucratic chiefs, bought off by petty
favors, or humbled by the imperial will.
Students played little part in politics for the next decade, however. The
calm at the university related to the recall in 1247 of Cheng Ch’ing-chih to
serve as councilor. Cheng Ch’ing-chih fared better than most owing to his
close association with Tao-hsu¨eh proponents and his many years of service at
the various university campuses, where he seems to have made many allies.
The late 1240s had more than its share of political problems, but students did
not attempt to intervene. They offered no resistance to the nomination of Shih
Chai-chih, son of Shih Mi-yu¨an, as minister of personnel and later as execu-
tive at the Bureau of Military Affairs, despite his reputation for corruption
and mediocrity. Students held their silence about Cheng Ch’ing-chih’s blatant
indulgence of a politically manipulative wife and a criminally larcenous son.
Even when they came out in support of Ch’eng Kuang-hsu¨ (chin-shih 1211),
a drafter at the Secretariat whom the councilor wished to dismiss, students
carefully avoided offending Cheng Ch’ing-chih personally.127 Such unusual
pliability owed something to the strong ties of Councilor Cheng to the uni-
versity, but also to his skill at steering opinion. For example, when making
the potentially controversial nomination of Shih Chai-chih to the Bureau of
Military Affairs, he appointed Ying Yao, a former university professor, as the
younger Shih’s superior and subsequently as assistant councilor. Similarly, the
elevation of the experienced frontier commander Chao K’uei first to assis-
tant councilor and then to chief councilor would placate irredentist students
inclined to challenge the appointment of Shih Chai-chih. The strategy proved
exceedingly successful.
The death of Cheng Ch’ing-chih in 1251 and the dismissal of Wu Ch’ien in
1252 compounded by the ascendancy of royal favorites and eunuchs at court and
the impotence of the succeeding councilors to curb their excesses, prompted a
new generation of students to take the offensive again. They were apparently
inspired to do so by Investigating Censor Hung T’ien-hsi. Allegations that
the eunuch Tung Sung-ch’en had illegally confiscated private property, which
coincided with the promotion of the notoriously unscrupulous Ting Ta-ch’u¨an
to a censorial post, so incensed Hung T’ien-hsi that he resigned in protest.
His resignation generated widespread censure of the chief councilor, Hsieh
Fang-shu, whose failure to defend his respected colleague implied his support
for the inner court. University students demanded Hsieh’s resignation. In
response, the eunuch Tung Sung-ch’en resorted to bribing a student at the
university to dispute the other students’ criticism. The ploy failed and the
student, denounced by his peers, was dismissed from the university, while
127 SS 415, p. 12459.
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Hsieh Fang-shu resigned.128 The students failed to win the recall of Hung
T’ien-hsi, but they had succeeded in having a second councilor driven from
office and in reasserting their political influence, a feat made easier by Tung
Sung-ch’en’s misguided effort to bribe one of their own.
This new victory added fire to the student movement. When the notorious
Ting Ta-ch’u¨an, in liaison with prominent eunuchs and consorts, forced Chief
Councilor Tung Huai out of the capital, a group of students led by Liu Fu
(b. 1217) and Ch’en I-chung (chin-shih 1262) protested. Ignoring imperial
instructions to refrain from criticizing court policy, they agitated for the dis-
missal of Ting Ta-ch’u¨an, and sustained their pressure for most of 1256. The
result was far from favorable for the students. Fifteen activists at the Imperial
University and the Imperial Clan Academy were rounded up, expelled from
the schools, and banished to the south to live under surveillance.129 The uni-
versity’s vice-chancellor responded by organizing a massive demonstration, in
the hope of forcing a compromise. But Li-tsung not only refused to reverse his
decision, he ordered a stone tablet to be erected on the campus inscribed with
a permanent injunction against the “irresponsible discussion of state affairs”
by students. Additionally, Li-tsung instructed university officials to scruti-
nize all student memorials before releasing them, a futile attempt at reviving
the censorship tactics that had been used by Han T’o-chou. School officials
demurred, for the most part, so the directive was chiefly ignored. Imperial
pressure, meanwhile, did not halt the student campaign of protest against
Ting Ta-ch’u¨an, which ended in his removal three years later.
After 1259, university influence improved only modestly. With Wu Ch’ien
as councilor of the left, the banished students were permitted to return to
the capital, and in a gesture of goodwill, the throne even exempted them
from departmental examinations in qualifying for chin-shih status. In this way,
Ch’en I-chung, a figure destined for later prominence, gained second place in
the palace examination of 1262. Calm returned to the campus for the next
several years, despite the emperor’s continued support for the eunuch Tung
Sung-ch’en and the nomination of Chia Ssu-tao as councilor. Much of the credit
for this stability belongs to Chia Ssu-tao. Through increased student stipends,
larger university enrollments, and special gifts to lesser school officials, he
garnered university support.130 In other circles, Chia was increasingly despised
and assailed, but not at the university. In the early 1260s several audacious
students criticized Chia Ssu-tao’s tight control of the court. Chia instructed
the prefect of Lin-an to round up the agitating students and tattoo them like
128 SS 417, pp. 12511–12; 424, pp. 12655–6; HTC (1958) 174, pp. 4752–3; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 53,
pp. 10a–b.
129 SS 474, p. 13778; HTC (1958) 175, p. 4764.
130 Wang, “Sung-tai t’ai-hsu¨eh yu¨ t’ai-hsu¨eh-sheng,” p. 206.
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common criminals.131 Chia’s severe order did not provoke the usual stir at
the university. Not until the councilor’s final years, in the early 1270s, did
students reassert themselves.
In explaining the heightened student activism in the Li-tsung era, modern
Chinese scholars often relate it to the “nationalism” or “national consciousness”
that emerged as a spontaneous emotional response to developments, largely
but not exclusively in foreign relations, that threatened the Sung dynasty.
Student activism during the Northern Sung had been most pronounced under
Hui-tsung and in the Southern Sung under Li-tsung, both periods character-
ized by a faction-riddled court, an exploitative government, and the ravages
of border warfare. Yet student censure was by no means confined to issues of
foreign policy. Students at the Imperial University may have resented Shih
Sung-chih’s perceived pacifism, but their 1244 indictment had focused specif-
ically on his personal ethics and, to a lesser extent, on the dangers associated
with one-family political dominance. Student criticisms of Tung Sung-ch’en
and Ting Ta-ch’u¨an during the early 1250s had addressed the threat to political
stability posed by eunuchs and families of the inner court; deteriorating con-
ditions along the border were of secondary importance. To portray the external
threat of foreign invasion as the essential stimulus to student activism ignores
the unique character of thought and politics in late Sung. It implies that had
either the Chin or Mongol armies not menaced the south, students at the
Imperial University would have remained tranquil despite the presence, at
various times, of eunuch power, consort influence, and imperial laxity. This
scenario underestimates the role of Tao-hsu¨eh teachings in inspiring student
idealism, the role of political tolerance in encouraging dissent, and the dis-
tinct character of individual decision makers who, at different times, inspired,
incited, patronized, and pressured different centers of power within the capital
and throughout the empire.
Domestic concerns
During Li-tsung’s reign, criticism of imperial conduct and government policies
was heightened by an onslaught of natural disasters. In Li-tsung’s long reign,
official records report seven major droughts in 1239, 1240, 1241, 1245, 1246,
1247, and 1254, and seven years of serious floods in 1229, 1236, 1242, 1251,
1252, 1255, and 1259; most of these occurred in central Sung territory. The
magnitude of these disasters was enormous. The floods of 1259 reportedly took
the lives of millions in Che-hsi circuit.132 Other disasters had human causes.
Major fires struck Lin-an in 1231, 1235, 1237, 1252, 1257, 1263, and 1264.
131 SS 474, p. 13782.
132 SS 409, pp. 12326–7.
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The overcrowded, urban living conditions of the capital, the narrowness of the
city’s streets, and the incendiary quality of building materials all made fires
difficult to prevent and easy to spread. They often continued for days and caused
incalculable loss.133 A sizable part of the Imperial City was ravaged by fire in
1231; in 1237 fires affected vast numbers of buildings spread through most of
the capital. Severe earthquakes were reported in the west in 1240 and 1255,
devastating invasions of locusts in the east in 1240 and 1242, and scattered
epidemic outbreaks in 1251. These disasters in turn caused famine and death on
a massive scale. Mongol-held territory in the north was not spared these types
of natural disasters either, and many northerners, receiving no meaningful
relief from their Mongol occupiers, chose to flee south. In 1239, the numbers
of refugees swelled to over a hundred thousand.134 Such calamities, coinciding
with military confrontations that dragged on for decades, further strained the
resources of a hard-pressed government.
As illustrated by Sogabe Shizuo, the Southern Sung empire still produced
an unprecedented level of wealth. With only half the territorial expanse, the
total government revenues during the late twelfth century roughly equaled
those of the Northern Sung at its height.135 Revenues from the salt and wine
monopolies were not negatively affected by the loss of territory either. This
phenomenon owes something to continuing population growth during the
Southern Sung period and to increased productivity in a generally prosperous
southern environment, but no less important to government revenues were
the proportionately higher tax rates and the imposition of a wide array of new
imposts and surcharges. Sung taxes may well have exceeded those imposed
during the Han and T’ang dynasties by ten times, and the Southern Sung taxes
were most often justified on the grounds of military preparedness.136 Mili-
tary expenditures notwithstanding, the Sung empire’s exchequer had boasted
sizable surpluses for most of the twelfth century. Such good fortune did not
persist under Kuang-tsung and Ning-tsung. Years of border conflict claimed a
growing share of the empire’s budget as tax revenues began to decline. From a
height of sixty-five million strings of cash under Hsiao-tsung, revenues plum-
meted to roughly thirty-five million by Ning-tsung’s reign. The plunge is often
attributed to the corruption of local clerks, under whom a progressively larger
share of taxes failed to reach the capital.137 Another factor was the growing
133 Jacques Gernet, Daily life in China on the eve of the Mongol invasion, 1250–1276, trans. H. M. Wright
(Stanford, Calif., 1962), pp. 34–8.
134 SS 414, p. 12429. Northern refugees were joined by a growing stream of migrants fleeing Mongol
assaults on Szechwan. See Paul J. Smith, “Family, landsmann, and status-group affinity in refugee
mobility strategies: The Mongol invasions and the diaspora of Sichuanese elites, 1230–1330,” Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies 52 No. 2 (1992), pp. 665–708.
135 Sogabe Shizuo, So¯dai zaiseishi (Tokyo, 1941), pp. 37–75.
136 Ch’en, Chung-kuo t’u-ti chih-tu, pp. 168–200, especially p. 191.
137 SS 41, p. 791; 42, pp. 815–16.
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tendency of regional governments to retain local tax revenues to cover the
escalating costs of regional defense. In effect, unbridled defense expenditures
fostered the decentralization of Sung fiscal authority.
By Li-tsung’s time, the fiscal pinch had become an acute crisis. The Mongol
invasion depopulated and left a wide expanse of border territory agriculturally
unproductive, causing a mammoth forty-five-year drain on revenues. In scale
and intensity, the new war easily dwarfed earlier Sung conflicts with the Tangut
and Jurchen. Szechwan, the center of many Mongol offensives, reportedly sent
no revenues to Lin-an after 1234; in better days it had annually provided
as much as twenty to thirty million strings of cash.138 The empire’s vast
storehouse of reserves shrank to a fraction of their former size. Intensification
of Mongol military activity in the 1250s only added more economic pressure.
At the height of the 1259–60 conflict, the Sung court disbursed an extra one
hundred and sixty-five million strings of cash, largely in the form of paper
currency, to pay for extraordinary military expenses. Efforts made to control
the spiraling military budget, such as forcing soldiers to till nearby fields and
adopting the local community defense system (pao-chia), appear to have netted
little savings for the government.139 Military expenditures, clerical corruption,
and disaster relief were not the only strains on the imperial exchequer. More
intrusive government policies had to be enforced, and this required more and
more officials to supervise each scheme. And the increasing population added
to the pressure. The Sung government was succumbing to the weight of its
own bureaucracy. As one censor observed in the 1250s, the Northern Sung
government had required only ten thousand officials to administer its 320-
odd administrative counties. The late Southern Sung empire, reduced to only
100 counties, employed in excess of twenty-four thousand officials.140
Rising expenditures and declining revenues left the Sung court little alter-
native to issuing massive amounts of paper money. According to Ch’u¨an Han-
sheng, the printing of paper currency began under Ning-tsung to subsidize
the K’ai-hsi war in 1206. From a circulation of paper notes with a total nom-
inal value of 24 million strings of copper cash in the late twelfth century,
the issue had increased to 140 million by 1207. Issues subsequently grew
to 230 million strings in 1224, 320 million strings in 1234, and by 1247
to an astonishing 650 million strings.141 Within a half century, the annual
amounts of paper currency issued had increased by a factor of twenty-five. No
138 SS 422, p. 12614; HTC (1958) 171, p. 4649.
139 SS 44–5.
140 SS 44, p. 858.
141 Ch’u¨an Han-sheng, “Sung-mo ti t’ung-huo p’eng-chang chi ch’i tui-yu¨ wu-chia ti ying-hsiang,” in
Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1964), pp. 263–325, especially
pp. 286–7; SS 423, pp. 12634–6.
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statistics exist for the 1250s, but in light of the government’s extraordinary
expenditures, a circulation of paper notes nominally worth in excess of a billion
strings of copper cash is quite likely. There was rampant inflation. The Sung
court apparently spent much of its stock of precious metals, which supposedly
had been set aside to back the paper currency. In 1259–60 the government
released over 150,000 ounces of silver, in addition to vast quantities of silk
and other valuables, to subsidize defense costs.142 Some of this may have come
from the emperor’s private treasury, which still contained sizable reserves, but
most apparently did not.
High taxes and soaring prices were enough to enrage bureaucrats living
on fixed salaries, city dwellers victimized by an unstable money supply, and
peasants unable to afford marketplace essentials. The high-handedness of a
hard-pressed government only compounded the problem. In 1238 under Shih
Sung-chih, for example, the Sung court printed a new issue currency and
required an unwilling populace to exchange five of the old for one of the new
notes. Shih Mi-yu¨an had done much the same nearly thirty years before, but at
a less onerous two-to-one exchange rate.143 Even more unsettling for ordinary
people was the collection of taxes years in advance, a practice introduced early
in Li-tsung’s reign. One censor writing in 1248 noted that taxes had already
been collected for 1254, six years in advance.144 In subsequent decades, as
dynastic fortunes continued to decline, such abuses grew worse.
It is easy to denounce Li-tsung’s court for its fiscal irresponsibility and
insensitivity to the plight of an overtaxed population. If Li-tsung had been
more conscientious as a ruler, more frugal in his personal use of dwindling
resources, and more insightful in his selection of chief ministers, could things
have turned out differently? The first economic crisis for the Southern Sung had
stemmed from military expenditures, and the subsequent deterioration of the
economy was related also to war. Perhaps the K’ai-hsi war of 1206 could have
been averted and confrontation with border military threats could have been
delayed, yet the Sung court had, in the final analysis, no means of predicting
Mongol actions in the north nor Mongol designs on the south. Restraint in the
printing of unbacked paper notes would have been more fiscally responsible,
but a government in desperation rarely practices such rational restraint. The
Sung was the first dynasty to experiment with paper currency, and having little
experience to draw upon, it had scant appreciation of the long-term economic
impact of its politically expedient measures. The curbing of local bureaucratic
142 SS 44, pp. 867–8.
143 Ch’u¨an, “Sung-mo ti t’ung-huo p’eng-chang chi ch’i tui-yu¨ wu-chia ti ying-hsiang,” pp. 297, 308; SS
42, p. 816.
144 SS 174, p. 4221.
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corruption would probably have offered some fiscal relief, yet the problem of
local bureaucratic misconduct was as old as the dynasty itself, and years of
experimentation had yielded no easy solutions. Corruption was probably the
rationale behind substantially increasing the size of the sub-bureaucracy, but
more clerks did not necessarily produce better administration, and whatever
graft the government, through additional clerks, managed to curtail, the extra
income derived was ultimately spent on the salaries of an enlarged bureaucracy.
Action to reduce tax evasion and land accumulation, if introduced early on,
probably would have eased the pinch, yet sweeping reforms were certain to
meet bureaucratic resistance. Most inhibiting with regard to efforts to save the
dynasty was the conviction by Tao-hsu¨eh proponents that the emperor’s moral
example was more critical than were legal reforms and pragmatic institutional
changes. A political climate that stressed ethics at the expense of methods
became an administrative impediment. When political reform finally came in
the 1260s, it was too late.
The combination of rampant inflation, bureaucratic corruption, inequitable
landownership, incessant war, and a long succession of natural disasters had
under past dynasties brought about widespread domestic unrest. The Southern
Sung was hardly immune to the consequences of such conditions. Excluding Li
Ch’u¨an and his confederates, who were banished and operated largely beyond
the Sung border, the first noteworthy outbreak of banditry under Li-tsung
had occurred in 1229–30. For years prior to this, small marauding bands had
pillaged the countryside; an edict in the spring of 1230 alludes to scattered
banditry throughout the Chiang-nan West, Ching-hu South, and Fu-chien
circuits, extending into Kuang-nan. The most ominous threat came initially
from coastal Fu-chien.145 These outbreaks must have been serious, for the Sung
court offered a general amnesty to all bandits who agreed to lay down their
arms. It also promised official rank to locals who contributed substantially
to any suppression efforts and granted tax exemption to the affected areas.
The government dispatched a small contingent of the Palace Guard and the
imperial navy to assist in the suppression, apparently fearing local forces would
be insufficient. Scarcely two months later, in the late spring of 1230, regional
armies at Chang-chou suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of bandits. At
the urgent request of Shih Mi-chung, a minor supervisor in Fu-chien and the
father of the future councilor Shih Sung-chih, the Sung court appointed Ch’en
Hua prefect of Nan-chien-chou and chief director of the suppression effort. A
145 On these outbreaks, see SS 419, pp. 12553–4, 12561–4; 420, pp. 12575–6; 437, p. 12963; 449,
p. 13227; 453, p. 13337; HTC (1958) 164, p. 4473; 165, pp. 4488–9, 4499; Hua Shan, “Nan Sung
Shao-ting, Tuan-p’ing chien ti Chiang, Min, Kuang nung-min ta ch’i-i,” Wen shih che No. 43 (1956),
pp. 41–8.
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disciple of Yeh Shih, Ch’en Hua was a native of Fu-chien whose familiarity
with local topography and customs the court hoped to exploit. Ch’en’s mission
was not easy. Having been neglected for years, the region’s bandits allegedly
numbered in the tens of thousands. T’ing-chou, Shao-wu, and the wealthy
part of Ch’u¨an-chou all were centers of bandit activities, as indeed was most
of Fu-chien, from its coastal ports to its western inland frontier.146
In mid-1230, a major confrontation between government forces and insur-
gents occurred at T’ing-chou, the inland refuge in southwestern Fu-chien for
weary bandits from coastal Chang-chou and Ch’u¨an-chou. Order was restored
by year’s end in large part by local defenders organized by the redoubtable
widow of a magistrate. Confrontations the next year occurred to the north,
in the vicinity of Shao-wu (in northwest Fukien province). In his efforts at
suppression, Ch’en Hua journeyed as far south as Ch’u¨-chou, in western Che-
tung, which is some indication of the difficulty he experienced containing
the outbreak. Another front in southern Fu-chien was commanded by Hsu¨
Ying-lung (chin-shih 1208), formerly a distinguished professor at the Impe-
rial University and another Fu-chien native. Named prefect of Ch’ao-chou
(Kuang-nan East near Fu-chien circuit), Hsu¨ Ying-lung challenged the forces
of “Three-Spear” Ch’en (Ch’en san-ch’iang), a bandit operating out of Kan-
chou (southern Kiangsi province) who supposedly butchered people over a
wide area. With assistance from Ch’en Hua, now prefect of Lung-hsing2, and
armies from western Fu-chien, Hsu¨ Ying-lung launched a devastating three-
pronged offensive. Three-Spear Ch’en and his confederates were pursued into
Hsing-ning county, northern Kuang-nan East, captured there, and returned
to Lung-hsing2 for execution in 1234. This marked the end of major bandit
activity in the southeast. A grateful court later awarded Ch’en Hua with an
appointment as assistant councilor.
The suppression of banditry involved mobilization of thousands of crack
troops and tens of thousands of militia, plus over four years of fighting. To
prevail, the Sung government implemented a variety of unpopular measures,
including revival of the local community defense system (pao-chia) and con-
scription for local militias. The desperation of Sung tactics and the duration
of the suppression effort suggest an imposing bandit force, but the outlaws
generally appear to have lacked organization and competent leadership. Had
the Sung not been at war with Chin, and had the bulk of its army not been tied
down along the northern border, such motley bands would probably have been
eliminated more quickly. Contemporaries attributed the bandit activity of the
era chiefly to bureaucratic corruption, excessive taxation, and pirate activity
146 See HTC (1958) 165, p. 4499.
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along the coast.147 The insurrections remained diffused and weak, and without
higher political aims to record.
Despite the deteriorating fiscal health of the Sung empire, only two ban-
dit outbreaks are recorded after 1234.148 Despite repeated military setbacks,
only three notable army mutinies erupted and these were easily quelled.149
Despite uninspiring political leadership, no bureaucratic challenge to the
throne emerged in the form of a coup. Indeed, more bandit outbreaks and army
mutinies are recorded for Ning-tsung’s twenty-five years, a time of greater rel-
ative stability, than in Li-tsung’s tumultuous forty years.
Li-tsung’s death was sudden and unexpected. On 14 November 1264 he was
too sick to attend court. Two days later he was dead. His formal testamentary
edict appointed his nephew and adoptive heir, Chao Ch’i (Tu-tsung, r. 1264–
74), as his successor, and the succession passed without incident. Chia Ssu-
tao remained firmly in control at court, enjoying a sumptuous lifestyle and
accumulating lavish treasures, and firmly supported by the new young emperor.
For the moment the Mongol pressure on the empire was eased. In 1259
the death of Mo¨ngke had led to Mongol civil conflict, and Khubilai, who
was responsible for the eastern Mongol domains, was temporarily preoccupied
with developments in Inner Asia. But Khubilai’s position remained strong. In
1254 he had carried out a campaign to outflank the Sung by driving down the
mountains on the western border of Szechwan to conquer the Ta-li realm in
Yunnan, and to subjugate northern Vietnam. He had overrun much of Szech-
wan, and although the Sung had restored control over much of it, the Mongols
were still in a powerful position along the Sung western and northern bor-
ders. The Sung military had not been overwhelmed, even though the Mongols
always held the initiative. In the east, Sung forces had maintained control
of the Huai frontier, and they tenaciously held on to the two vital strategic
fortresses of Ho-chou3, the key to an eastern advance down the Yangtze River,
and Hsiang-yang, which defended against advances from the north into the
Hupei region and down the Han River valley.
147 SS 437, p. 12963.
148 SS 421, p. 12591; HTC (1958) 173, pp. 4725–6. One writer attributes the infrequency of rebel activity
to poor documentation for the last half century of Sung rule. However, the Veritable records (shih-lu)
for the Li-tsung reign, compiled in 1268, were certainly available to historians compiling the Sung
dynastic history; therefore, poor documentation alone cannot explain the dearth of references in official
sources to popular rebellions after 1230; see Li Jung-ts’un, “Sung-tai Hu-pei lu liang-chiang ti-ch’u¨ ti
man-luan,” Pien-cheng yen-chiu-so nien-pao 9 (1978), pp. 131–81.
149 SS 417, p. 12508; 454, p. 13346.
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